























































Palestinian Bedouins have been unfavorably affected by occupation policies of 
forced resettlement, urbanization, and demolition of their homes. This thesis examines 
the social and cultural change that transformed the Bedouins in the West Bank of 
Palestine. My research is based on a case study of the al Jahalin tribe who were expelled 
from their original land al-Naqab after the 1948 war and the birth of Israel. The Bedouins 
became refugees in scattered areas in the West Bank and after the 1993 Oslo Accord they 
represented an obstacle for the expansion of illegal settlements in the occupied territory 
and faced expulsion for the second time. As a result of the Israeli occupation 
displacement policy, the Bedouins in the West Bank were forcibly displaced in small 
villages. This research is based on interviews, which I conducted with Bedouin sheikhs, 
men, women and children in the West Bank as well as a direct observation between the 
years 2012-2018. I argue that despite Bedouin women being subjected to patriarchal rule 
and tradition, the military rule and occupation of the West Bank played a dominant role 
in oppressing, marginalizing, harassing, and humiliating the Bedouin women in the West 
Bank.  This thesis also explores the gendered nature of occupation and the loss of 
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Route 181, Fragments of a Journey in Palestine-Israel, a 2003 documentary by 
Palestinian filmmaker Michel Khleifi and Israeli filmmaker Eyal Sivan details an old man’s 
testimony of how he took part in a 1948 operation that expelled Palestinian Bedouins from 
their homes in North Palestine. Aaron Greenberg, born in Tel Aviv to Russian and Lithuanian 
parents, was seventy years old during the 2003 interview. This film includes an interview with 
seventy-year old Aaron Greenberg who as a young man expelled Bedouin from northern 
Palestine. According to Greenberg, the Palestinian Bedouins blocked the way to the Arab 
villages during the operation of Matateh; therefore, they were chased away. “We chased them 
to Jordan. You fire in the air, and they scram. We swept them out. We needed them out of the 
region to create a Jewish territorial continuity. We were armed. When they saw us coming they 
fled.”1 Without hesitation about his participation in expelling and killing the Bedouins and the 
Palestinians, Greenberg states that once the Bedouins were pushed towards Jordan, they were 
not allowed to return to their homes. During the interview, Greenberg is asked why this 
particular operation was called “Matateh,” and he says that in Hebrew, “Matateh means a 
broom, to clean the earth, because we swept out the Arabs, especially the nomads. We had to 
                                                        
1  Greenberg, Aaron. Route 181, Fragments of a Journey in Palestine- Israel. You tube. Directed by Eyal 
Sivan and Michel Khleife. France, 2003. 
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chase them. The aim was to get rid of them for Jewish settlements and kibbutz. The land went 
to kibbutz and moshavs.”2  
The Matateh operation is one example of many operations that took place in 
Palestine in 1948, prior to 1948, and currently that fit the definition of “settler colonialism.” In 
settler colonialism, the colonizers operate as if the country is empty despite the fact that an 
indigenous population occupies it. As the Australian scholar Patrick Wolf says, “Settler 
colonialism is a form that is exclusive, settler colonialism destroys to replace.”3  This primary 
motive for the elimination and expulsion of the Bedouins explains the territory’s occupation 
and the replacement of the indigenous with new settlers. 
Israeli settlements in the West Bank remain illegal under international law. These 
illegal settlements violate Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits the 
transfer of occupying power’s civilian population into the occupied territory. Despite Israel 
becoming a signatory in 1951, Israel continues to displace Palestinians from their ancestral 
land in order replace them with Jewish settlers.4 
Whether inspired by religion or secular nationalism, the State of Israel is a settler 
colonialist project. As a settler colonialist project, the settlers must depopulate the land from its 
people to sustain their colonialist project. The 1948 Negev Brigade harassed the Negev 
Bedouins and carried out a full-scale clearing operation in the area. This operation sought to 
demolish the town of Beersheba. Bedouins from the town were expelled, leaving by foot and in 
busses. They left towards Hebron, Jerusalem, and Bethlehem following repeated IAF bombing. 
Immediately after the war of 1948, they forced Bedouins into reservations that Israel defined as 
                                                        
2 Ibid., 
3 Patrick Wolf, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Journal of Genocide Research, 8 
(2006): 387-409.  
4 International committee of the Red Cross, Treaties, States Parties and commentaries.  
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“closed military areas.” The Bedouins lived under restriction of movement, preventing them 
from returning to or cultivating their land.5 
In 1953, after the mass displacement of the Bedouins from their land, Israeli law 
declared that any unsettled land or any uncultivated land as of April 1, 1952 would be 
considered “expropriate.” This law conveniently coincided with the removal of most of the 
Bedouins in the Naqab (or Negev in Hebrew). According to a report by Adalah, (“justice” in 
Arabic) is the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel the Naqab desert was allocated 
to the district of Bi’r al-Saba’.  Despite the Bedouins’ rights and their ownership documents, 
the Israeli government enforced the law and classified all Bedouin land in the Naqab as state-
owned land. In Spring 2016, I decided to visit the unrecognized village of Al Araqib and see 
myself the situation after the village was demolished and rebuilt 95 times between the years 
1999 to 2016.  The village inhabitants were displaced in 1951 by the Israeli authorities and 
were promised their return after few months.  Between the year of 1950 and 1953, Israel 
passed two laws, which legalized the displacement of the Bedouins and the confiscation of 
their land.  
 The first law was the Absentees’ Property Law and the second law was called the Land 
Acquisition Law. These laws declared the Bedouins land to be confiscated by the State for 
Jewish use only.  During this time many Bedouin villages including the village of Al-Araqib 
were declared illegal, unrecognized and “state land.” Adalah, explained that in 1972 Israeli 
allowed citizens to submit land registration applications under the Land Registration 
Ordinance.6 The families of al-Araqib submitted their land claims, but were denied the ability 
to return to their land.  In 1998 a couple of the families who hold documents proving the 
                                                        
5 Mansour Nasasra , The Naqab Bedouins: A Century of Politics and Resistance.(New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2017) 120.  
6 Ibid.,  
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ownership of the land moved back to their village.  Al- Araqib is a Bedouin village in the 
Negev that existed prior to 1948 in the southern part of historical Palestine.  
        In 1965 Israel declared a law claiming that the Bedouin villages in the Negev, including 
al-Araqib, are illegal. The villages’ unrecognized status according to the State of Israel means 
that the Bedouin families living in theses villages face house demolition and denial of basic 
services that are available to only Jewish Israeli citizens, such as state infrastructure including 
water, electricity, sewerage, roads, schools and health care. 
           I met the spokesperson of Al- Araqib village, Sheikh Sayyah Al Turi. He stated,  “How 
can the Israeli authority accuse us of being invaders and squatters when our village al- Araqib 
existed before the creation of the Israeli state? On the contrary, they are the invaders and the 
colonizers.  There are 35 Bedouin villages that are declared as ‘unrecognized’. We have the 
right to stay on our land. We were 75 families. Look at us now! We ended up with a few 
families and the rest were forcibly displaced to small towns that are not even equipped for our 
Bedouin lifestyle or for a modern life. They displaced us just for them to build new Jewish 
settlements.” 
The Bedouins who were forced to leave the Naqab moved to the West Bank around 
Jerusalem, Hebron, Bethlehem, and Jericho. The Jahalin Bedouins settled around villages such 
as Nabi Musa, Abu Dis, al- Eizariya, and Khan al- Ahmar. These new areas were spacious and 
were distinguished by many pastures and water sources nearby, which allowed the Bedouins to 
resume their way of life.  Today many Bedouin communities are scattered in Az Zaayyem, al-
Jib, Zaatreh Az Zaim, Jabal al Baba, Beit Iksa, and Nabi Samuel in the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem who are known as the Arab Jahalin. Although these areas are part of village land, 
and owned by the nearby villagers, the Bedouins settled with their tents and animals. The 
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Jahalin had open access to the markets in Jerusalem and became very dependent on these 
markets to sell their products, which included meat, cheeses, and yogurt. 
After the occupation of the West Bank in 1967, the Jahalin Bedouins were exposed to 
another wave of ethnic cleansing. Occupation forces started to restrict the land inhabited by the 
refugee Bedouins. In 1963, former Minister of Israeli military leader Moshe Dayan said:  
We should transform the Bedouins into an urban proletariat- industry, services, 
construction, and agriculture. 88% of the Israeli population are not farmers, let the 
Bedouins be like them. Indeed, this will be a radical move, which means that the 
Bedouin would not live on his land with his herds, but would become an urban 
person who comes home in the afternoon and puts his slippers on. His children will 
get used to a father who wears pants, without a dagger, and who does not pick put 
their nits in public. They will go to school, their hair combed and parted. This will be 
a revolution, but it can be achieved on two generations. Without coercion but with 
government direction… this phenomenon of the Bedouins will disappear.7 
 
The primary focus of Israeli demographic policies was to concentrate the Bedouins 
in one area. Under this policy, the Bedouins suffered harsh military procedures that restricted 
their movements. They became unable to enter or leave their own area without army 
permission. The Israeli forced displacement and urbanization policies against the Bedouins can 
be seen as a cultural cleansing against the marginalized minorities. I argue in this thesis that the 
systematic Israel’s policy to destroy the Jahalin Bedouin culture under the guise of 
urbanization is in fact an organized demographic policy intent on cultural cleansing of the 
Bedouin’s centuries old unique way of life and removing the Bedouins from Area C of the 
West Bank.   
For over sixty years, Bedouins have lived as refugees and suffered extreme poverty, 
food insecurity, unemployment, regular home demolitions, forced displacement, and most 
importantly loss of their customary way of life. According to a 2013 United Nations 
                                                        
7  Mansour Nasasra, The Naqab Bedouins: A Century of Politics and Resistance (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2017), 202. 
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Development Program report, there are around 40,000 Bedouins in the occupied territory, most 
of which are refugees and displaced.8  Seventy years after the birth of the Israeli state, the 
Bedouin problem remains unresolved, and Israeli policy continues to violate the indigenous 
rights of the Bedouins. 
   On the morning of April 2, 2015, I was visiting the Bedouin communities in the 
West Bank with a friend; during my visit I witnessed the confiscation of the Bedouin land 
called Jabel West in the West Bank. The Israeli authorities claimed that Jabel West was a 
military zone known as “Area C.” As a military zone, the Israelis deemed it illegal for 
Palestinians to live on this land. This prohibition only applies to non-Jews inasmuch as a 
Jewish settlement was constructed few meters away. 
We spent almost an hour trying to convince the soldiers, without any success, that it 
is a crime against humanity to displace and depopulate the area of its inhabitants. Then we 
traveled about twenty minutes west to visit Khan al Ahmar, another Bedouin village. Khan al-
Ahmar was a larger problem. Upon arrival, I noticed an inordinate number of Israeli soldiers 
and policemen with their military tanks. That meant there was unrest. The Israeli military 
prevented NGOs and media from entering Khan al-Ahmar. One of the many protestors, Arik 
Ascherman, the president of Rabbis for Human Rights (an NGO made up of rabbis who oppose 
the demolition of homes and displacement of villages) stood out from the crowd with his loud 
recitation of verses from the Old Testament that oppose such unlawful confiscations. The 
Israeli authorities used the designation of Khan al- Ahmar as Area C as an excuse to force the 
Bedouins off their land.  
                                                        
8 UNDP, September, 2013. In focus: Bedouins in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 
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The purpose of this particular attack was to confiscate twelve solar panels that had 
been installed a few weeks earlier. These panels, the sole source of electricity in the 
community of Khan al Ahmar, gave the small village a few hours of electricity daily. The 
neighboring Israeli settlement of Ma’ale Adumim, does not suffer from any lack of electricity 
or water. Comparing these settlements, it is very clear that Israeli policy denies the Jahalin 
Bedouins, one of the largest tribes that originated from the Naqab and became refugees in the 
West Bank after 1950,access to the power grid and prevents any possibility for construction. 
 While watching the demonstration against the confiscation of the panels a United 
Nations official said, Israel wanted to expel the Bedouins from Khan al Ahmar in order to 
connect the Israeli settlement Ma’ale Adumim to Jerusalem. The connection of the settlement 
to Jerusalem is part of what Israel calls the E1 Plan, which aims to divide the West Bank into 
two. According to PM Palestine Monitor news, to achieve the E1 Plan is to destroy twenty-
three Palestinian Bedouin villages and transfer some 2,300 men, women, and children to Abu 
Dis, which is next to a garbage dump.9  Not only will they lose their land, the forced relocation 
next to a garbage dump would not permit them to continue to live their traditional nomadic 
lifestyle.  
Ma’ale Adumim is the third largest illegal Israeli settlement in the West Bank, 
established in 1979 on confiscated land from the Palestinian village of ‘Anata. According to a 
B’Tselem and Bimkom report between 1975 and 1977 Israeli authorities confiscated more 
than three thousand hectares of the village of al-‘Azariya, al-Tur, al-‘Isawiyya, ‘Anata, Abu 
Dis, Khan al-Ahmar, and Nabi Musa to build Ma’ale Adumim. While its population consists 
of a mix of religious and secular Jews, Ma’ale Adumim remains a Jewish –only settlement 
                                                        
9 Fatima Masri, “Bedouins in Anata and Abu Dis Face Physical Assault and threat of Forceful Eviction,” 
Palestine Monitor, June 4, 2013, accessed October 21, 2018, Palestinemonitor.org.  
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and achieved status as a city in 199110Despite the presence of many NGOs, media, and 
outside observers protesting against the confiscation of the solar panels in Khan al Ahmar, the 
Israelis removed the panels forcibly and pressured the Bedouins to leave their small village. 
In 2015, Eid Abu Khamis from Khan al-Ahmar, the spokesperson for his 
community, explained to our group that the confiscation of the solar panels would not 
pressure him and his family to leave his home. “My tent is my freedom, and the open space is 
my culture. I will not leave my tent.” Despite the multiple threats to demolish their homes and 
school from the Israeli authorities, he and his community remained steadfast and remained on 
their land. Khamis explained that he had previously lived with his family in a place called 
Khirbet al-Murssas, east of al-’Azariya and a few kilometers from Jerusalem. His family 
raised flocks and farmed the land until the establishment of the settlement of Ma’ale Adumim: 
“My family was displaced to a nearby site, and we lost most of the land that had wells and 
water.”  Khamis and his family were then expelled to a nearby location where the Israeli 
forces began sending them more demolition orders and forcing them to move again in order to 
expand the illegal Israeli settlement. 
In May 2018, the Israeli High Court ruled against the Khan al-Ahmar and all the 
Bedouin communities in Area C. Khan al-Ahmar’s school and homes may be demolished at 
any time due to the Israeli High Court rule. This Israeli policy aims to clear the area of any 
Palestinian presence. On July 4, 2018, the Israeli Civil Administration, escorted by Israeli 
police, paved a road through Khan al-Ahmar to expel the Jahalin Bedouins. During the forced 
transfer, multiple Bedouins were injured. Israel is forcibly assimilating this once-mobile, 
                                                        
10 Bimkom and B’Tselem, “The Hidden Agenda: The Establishment and Expansion Plans of Ma’ale 
Adumim and their Human Rights Ramifications” (December 2009), online at 
www.btselem.org/download/200912_maale_adummim_eng.pdf(accessed 23 October 2018).  
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pastoral people from their social, economic, and cultural roots, resulting in social 
disintegration and increased mortality, morbidity, domestic violence, and instability. 
Since 1967, Israel has occupied the West Bank, including Eastern Jerusalem. Under 
international law, occupation should be temporary, and the occupying power is prohibited 
from establishing any permanent residence on the occupied territory. The fourth Geneva 
Convention forbids the occupying power to transfer its civilian population to the occupied 
territory. This has been confirmed by the International Court of Justice, the High Contracting 
Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention and the United Nations Security Council.11 This 
includes the establishment of Jewish settlements on privately owned Palestinian land.  The 
occupying power also has the duty to protect public and private property, but Israel 
continually breaches this duty by establishing more illegal settlements and confiscating more 
land. For instance, the struggles of the Jahalin Bedouins did not end with displacement and 
expulsion.  
The Israeli “ethnic cleansing” tactics brought social and economic crises, 
psychological and identity problems, and environmental health-related violence. According to 
B’Tselem’s newsletter ( B’Tselem, a Jerusalem- based non-profit organization that documents 
human rights violation in the Israeli-occupied territories), life next to one ton of garbage that 
is only 300 meters away from the Bedouins relocated homes involves several serious 
problems for the Bedouins.  It is liable to cause severe environmental damage and endanger 
lives. In addition, the displacement prevents the Bedouins from maintaining their traditional 
                                                        
11United Nations Office For the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian Territory. The 
Humanitarian Impact of Israeli Settlement Policies, December 2012. 
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way of life, which depends on spacious pasturelands for raising their livestock.12 The Israeli 
policy to ethnically cleanse the land of Palestinians is working albeit by gradual death. 
The Bedouins became refuges in scattered areas in the West Bank, Sinai, and 
Naqab. After the 1993 Oslo Accord, they became the obstacle for the expansion of illegal 
settlements in the occupied territory and faced expulsion for the second time. My research 
examines the main change in the Bedouins’ cultural, socio-political, and socio-economic 
landscapes through the loss of their way of life.  
My research is based on a case study of the Al Jahalin tribe, who were expelled 
from their original land, Naqab, after the 1948 war. I discuss the tactics and strategies that the 
Israeli forces use against the Bedouins in Palestine. I argue that “ethnic cleansing” and its 
violent outcomes can be seen through the psychological, economic, social, and environmental 
health-related violence. Despite many Bedouins achieving a higher education, they still 
struggle to find their place between an urbanized lifestyle, traditional Bedouin lifestyle, and 
life under occupation. This thesis also explores the gendered nature of occupation and the loss 
of identity, livelihood, and changing roles concerning household power structure. Gender 
roles in Bedouin life have been severely affected by forced displacement and urbanization.   
The Jahalin Bedouins were forced to what Israel called “urban life”, but in reality 
the Israeli urban model next to garbage dump was a superficial one and did not have the basic 
needs for a developed town.  Bedouin identity has been reshaped due to the rapid change in 
Bedouin livelihood.  Today the Jahalin are the marginalized group and most effected by the 
forced displacement and the Israeli occupation amongst the Palestinian within Area C.  My 
work is built around the Jahalin Bedouins through personal interviews and fieldwork, which 
add to the discussion of gender and identity issues. 
                                                        
12 Ibid.,  
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This thesis is divided into seven chapters, Chapter One is an introduction. Chapter 
Two is a short historiography, an overview of the history of the expulsion of the Palestinians 
during the 1948 war. It examines Palestinian expulsion in general in addition to focusing on 
the Bedouins who originated from the Naqab in historical Palestine. Additionally, this chapter 
examines how historians through time have written about the Bedouins but primarily only 
mention them briefly.  The second chapter presents the New Historians’ approach, which not 
only challenges the Zionist Israeli traditional narrative regarding the expulsion and 
displacement of the Palestinians during the 1948 war but creates a conflict within the field.  
After reviewing multiple scholars on the historiography of the expulsion of the Palestinians in 
1948, I found that the Palestinians voice was not included. There is no Palestinian archive, but 
that does not mean that Palestinians did not write about the expulsion of the Palestinians in 
1948.  The writing of it was in different style than the West. The Palestinians oral history and 
memoirs were and still available. These memoirs and recorded history were not taken 
seriously by the West and did not make it in the scholarly word. This is in part because they 
were not written by professional historians and were written in Arabic. This can explain why 
the Arab Palestinian Bedouins have been ignored in the scholarly literature and why they have 
not been mentioned as part of the Palestinian struggle.    
Chapter Three illustrates the Bedouin role in historical Palestine during the Ottoman 
Period, the English Mandate to the creation of Israel in 1948.  After reviewing the history of 
the Palestinian Bedouin I argue that the current situation with the Israeli displacement polices 
against the Jahalin Bedouins in eastern Jerusalem is a continuation of an ethnic cleansing that 
started during the creation of Israel. After the establishment of the Israeli State, the Naqab 
desert became part of the Israeli territory, which dramatically transformed the life of the 
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indigenous people and disrupted their source of livelihood. Since 1948, as with other 
indigenous minorities, the Bedouins continue the struggle for equality, recognition, and 
preservation of their culture and way of life. In order to understand the current situation of the 
Jahalin displaced from Area C, it is important to look back sixty-five years and understand 
what brought them to this situation.  
   Chapter Four examines the Arab Jahalin tribe and its second expulsion for 
expansion of a Jewish settlement in the Occupied West Bank. The policy of ethnic cleansing 
has been implemented against the Palestinian Bedouins since the creation of the Israeli state in 
1948 and continued throughout the Oslo accord in 1993. This chapter focuses on the six 
communities from the Jahalin tribe in Palestine: Al Jib, Jabal al Baba, Beit Iksa , Nabi Samuel 
, Khan al- Ahmar, and Sateh al -Baher in the West Bank and East Jerusalem 
The Fifth and Sixth chapters focus on the identity of the Palestinian Arab Bedouins 
and what it means to be Palestinian Bedouin in the state of Israel and in the occupied 
territories. In addition, these chapters aim to examine the gendered aspect of Bedouin life and 
culture. The association between occupation, displacement, urbanization, patriarchy, and the 
status of the Bedouin women has received little attention within the scholarly world. I will 
explore the significant changes in gender roles in the Bedouin society and modification in 
their way of life. These gender roles transformed due to the impact of occupation, expansion 
of Jewish settlements, and forced urbanization American anthropologist, Donald P. Cole 
explains, “Bedouin is not defined as an occupation that is recorded on national identity cards 
or passports.”13   
The Seventh chapter is my conclusion. These chapters are based on my fieldwork 
with the Jahalin Bedouins, which spanned six years in the West Bank from 2012-2018. Most 
                                                        
13 Donald P. Cole, “Where Have the Bedouin Gone?” Anthropological Quarterly 76, no. 2 (2003): 235-67. 
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of the Bedouins I have met have said that despite the changes that they have had to endure—
socio-political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural—they still identify themselves as 























Historiography of Bedouin in Palestine 
 
I examine the work of numerous historians through time who have written about the 
Bedouins. This Chapter surveys the New Historian’s approach. This approach not only 
challenges the Zionist Israeli traditional narrative regarding the expulsion and displacement of 
the Palestinians during the 1948 war, but has transformed the field altogether. My review of 
the most prominent scholars on the historiography of the expulsion of the Palestinians in 
1948, I discovered that the voice of Palestinian Bedouins was not included; in fact, it was 
totally ignored.  
NGOs have heavily influenced the history about the Naqab Bedouins. Since the 
NGO’s focus on the impact of the Israeli state and the occupation on the pressing current 
economic and social facing Bedouins, they do not devote any resources to study and 
understand conditions of the Bedouins before 1948. My study and research focuses on the 
Bedouin in the West Bank who have been significantly underrepresented in history books and 
scholarly research.  
 
The declaration of the State of Israel in 1948 was complicated by religion and 
colonialism.   According to Illan Pappé, it was a mix between those who regard the Bible as a 
fundamental historical account and believe in the redemption of the land that God promised 
them with, and those who took similar steps of the colonial movements of Europeans who had 
colonized the two Americas, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand.14 Whether it was 
religion or colonialism, the aim was to depopulate the land from its people. 
                                                        
14 Illan Pappe, Ten Myths About Israel (London: Verso, 2017), 41.  
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The scholarly literature overall ignores the expulsion of the Palestinian Arab Bedouins. 
Middle Eastern historians do not focus on marginalized Bedouins in Palestine during the 
Nakba15 and the occupation of historical Palestine in 1948 Historians of the Middle East write 
about the 1948-1967 wars and the partition that began prior to 1948, ignoring the minorities of 
the region. Why were the Arab Bedouins in Palestine ignored through the scholarly research 
on Palestine-Israel in the twentieth century? This question relates to the Ottoman Empire, and 
the English Mandate, and the Israeli occupation. Although my focus is on the Bedouins in 
Palestine, most historians today and in the past that wrote about Palestine-Israel only mention 
the Bedouins in passing. During the Ottoman period, the Arab Bedouins in the Naqab were 
administratively segregated from the rest of the Palestinian population, being romantically 
thought of as socially and culturally distinctive.16 During the creation of the Israeli State, 
750,000 Palestinians were expelled and became refugees, and amongst these Palestinian 
refugees there were 75,000 Bedouins.17  
 Writers prior to the twentieth century ignored the Bedouins because they were 
marginalized and defined as not civilized people.  Anthropologist Richard Ratcliffe, Mansour 
Nasasra, Sarab Abu-Rabia-Queder, and Sophie Richter-Devroe, all agree that “European 
travelers and writers such as J.L. Bakhard and Alois Musil had quite different and often 
transient reasons for their interest. Their view of the Bedouins was often bucolic, resonant 
with Rousseau’s idea of the noble savage or biblical shepherded, guided by the imputed purity 
                                                        
15 Lila Abu-Lughod and Ahmad H. Sa’di, “Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), 3. Nakba(the Arabic word for catastrophe: “The 1948 war that led to the 
creation of Israel also resulted in the expulsion of at least 80 percent of the Palestinian people. 
16Nasara, Mansour and Sophie Richter-Devroe, ed. The Naqab Bedouin and Colonialism: New Perspective 
(London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), 3. 
17 Nur Masalha, Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of “Transfer” in the Zionist Political Thought, 
1882-1948 (Washington D.C.:1992) 173.  
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and honor of their life. This work was outside the context of formal academic production.”18 
   My review of these historians and my own research proves that the Palestinian 
narrative was accurate regarding the 1948 expulsion. I will examine the Palestinian narrative, 
the old Zionist narrative, and the New Historian narrative. In addition, I will add my own 
narrative about the expulsion of the Palestinian Bedouins and the forced displacement that is 
taking place today. The 1948 war and the question of the expulsion of the Palestinians brought 
bigger controversy than any other period of the Palestine-Israel discourse. 
 Although my focus is on the question of the Bedouins, it is necessary to go through the written 
history of the expulsion of the Palestinians during the 1948 war in order to     
 understand the role of the minorities, which in this case are the Bedouins. 
Israeli traditional narrative in general regarding the periods from 1948 until the 
1980s lacked the research, observation, and oral testimonies and instead utilized romanticism. 
This romanticism was influenced by patriotism for their nation-state and admiration for 
national heroes. Although the history of the Palestinian refugees presented by Palestinian 
scholars prior to the Israeli New Historian perspective, the oral history and testimonies from 
survivors have largely been ignored. 
It was not until 1988, that Israeli historians brought a new perspective that was in 
opposition to the traditional Israeli point of view. Israeli scholars used the Israeli archives, 
made available by the Israeli government in the late 80s, to develop this new perspective 
regarding the making of the Israeli state. Leading scholars on the topic became known as “the 
New Historians.” The New Historians sought to reexamine the Zionist policy of the making of 
the state of Israel. The well known, leading New Historian scholars are Benny Morris, a 
professor of history at Ben-Gurion University. His publications include The Birth of the 
                                                        
18 Nasara Mansour, The Naqab Bedouin, 4. 
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Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949; The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 
Revisited, and One State, Two Sates.   
Illan Pappé, a professor of History at the Institute of Arab And Islamic Studies at 
the College of Social Sciences and International Studies and Director of the European Center 
for Palestine Studies at the University of Exeter; his publications include The Ethnic 
Cleansing of Palestine and The Biggest Prison on Earth: A History of the Occupied 
Territories, Avi Shlaim, a fellow of St. Antony’s College and a professor of international 
relations at the University of Oxford. His books include The Iran Wall: Israel and the Arab 
World and Israel and Palestine: Reappraisals, Revisions, Refutations, and Tom Segev, 
columnist for Ha’aretz, Israel’s leading newspaper, and the author of One Palestine, 
Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate. They all revised the political ideology 
of the Zionist movement prior to and after the creation of the Israeli state, and they all have a 
different conclusion about how the Palestinian Exodus in 1948 took place, some of which 
contradict the old narrative. 
 In The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Pappé illustrates that ethnic cleansing was 
planned against the Palestinians to empty the land for the new Jewish comers. Pappé looks at 
the ethnic cleansing as a crime against humanity. Whereas Morris looks at the expulsion as a 
necessary attempt in order to have a nation state called Israel. Despite the distinct 
perspectives, they agree that the Palestinian refugees in 1948 were chased out and expelled 
through violence and massacres. 
   Despite certain disagreements, they all agreed on the forced displacement and the 
terror used by the Zionists against the Palestinians in order to pave the way for the new Jewish 
arrivals. This was not just the biggest challenge to the traditional Israeli narrative about the 
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1948 war, but it stirred up more controversy than any other event that took place in the 
making of the Israeli State. An example of the old traditional Zionist narrative comes from 
David Ben-Gurion, the first Israeli Prime Minster, in 1961. According to William James 
Martin, Professor at the University of Florida, in 1961 Prime Minister David Ben Gurion 
declared in the Israeli Knesset the myth that became known as the Zionist narrative. The 
declaration states:  “The Arabs’ exit from Palestine …began immediately after the UN 
Resolution, from the areas earmarked for Jewish state. And we have explicit documents 
testifying that they left Palestine following instructions by the Arab leaders, with the Mufti at 
their head, under the assumption that the invasion of the Arab armies at the expiration of the 
Mandate will destroy the Jewish state and push all the Jews into the sea, dead or alive.”19 
In 1987, Simha Flapan which argues that, “The Palestinian Exodus of 1948” where he 
illustrates the Zionist narrative and how after thousands of documents in the Zionist archives 
became available, and the diaries of Ben Gurion show that there is no evidence supporting the 
Israeli claim of the Palestinians leaving their land and homes voluntary.20   
In The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Pappé explains that the Zionists used religion 
to colonize Palestine, that Eretz Israel is the name of Palestine in the Jewish religion, and that 
Palestine was the holy pilgrimage for the Jewish people and never a homeland. His approach 
to the making of the state of Israel in 1948 takes us to the Old Testament where the “Jewish 
tradition and religion clearly instruct Jews to await the coming of the promised Messiah at the 
‘end of times’ before they can return to Eretz Israel as a sovereign people in a Jewish 
theocracy, that is, as the obedient servants of God this is why today several streams of Ultra-
Orthodox Jews are either non or anti-Zionist.” 
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21 Ismael Abu Saad, the founding director of the Center for Bedouin Studies and 
Development at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, agrees with Pappé. Abu Saad has 
authored and edited over one hundred publications including the book The Future of 
Indigenous Peoples: Strategies for Survival and Development in 2003. He explains that the 
Zionist movement during the Ottoman period and the British mandate were nothing but 
colonial ventures, a policy that began in Europe in the late 1800s with the goal of establishing 
a Jewish State in Palestine. 22 During this period, the Zionists portrayed Palestine as “land 
without people, for a people without land.” This was another myth used against the 
Palestinians. 
On December 19, 1948, Ben-Gurion said, “We adopt the system of aggressive 
defense, with every Arab attack we must respond with a decisive blow: the destruction of the 
place or the expulsion of the residents along with the seizure of the place.”23 This contradicts 
his quote in 1961, that the Palestinians left their homes and villages following instructions by 
Arab leaders. Ofer Aderet wrote a review in Haaretz newspaper about a biography of Ben-
Gurion written by an Israeli historian, Tom Segev. In the biography, explains that when Ben-
Gurion established the Unity of Labor Party in 1919, reassert in many ways that there was no 
chance for peace with the Arabs. Moreover, in 1930, Ben-Gurion stated, “I am in favor of a 
forced transfer. I do not see anything immoral about it.”24 These quotes by Zionists contradict 
their traditional narrative that Palestinians fled their country because Arab leaders told them to 
do so.  
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Simha Flapan’s 1987 book, The Birth of Israel, Myths and Realities calls this 
narrative what it is: a myth. Flapan, who did not use the Israeli archives and wrote his book 
prior to the birth of the New Historians (Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim and Illan Pappé) 
illustrated seven myths that the old narrative used to justify the existence of the Jewish State. 
The seven myths served the Israeli nationalist agenda. The third myth was that “the flight of 
the Palestinians from the country, both before and after the establishment of the state of Israel, 
came in response to a call by the Arab leaders to leave temporarily, in order to return with the 
victorious Arab armies. They fled despite the efforts of the Jewish leadership to persuade 
them to stay.”25 
These myths have largely shaped the traditional Israeli narrative and only in the late 
1980s did the New Historians have the opportunity to use the Israeli archives, because there is 
a 40-year-rule on the declassification of official documents. They did not just challenge the 
traditional Israeli narrative regarding the “myths” as Flapan puts it, but they also opened 
themselves to conflict with their own Israeli state. According to Flapan, the Zionists planned 
the transfer of the Palestinians, as it was part of their colonialist policy of expulsion.26  
 
How did the old narrative develop?  
According to Walid Khalidi, founder of the Institute for Palestine Studies formerly 
at Oxford University states that in the 1950s, the story was all over the British media. By this 
time, Khalidi explains, the predominant Israeli version was that the orders had been 
broadcasted by the top Palestinian leadership.27 According to Ahmad H. Sa’di, the mainstream 
Western media played a role in developing the old Zionist narrative and spread the myths of 
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how the European Jews became a nation. Sa’di said, “The story presented was the standard 
narrative of glorious rebirth, a story of exile and return after millennia.”28 This old narrative 
ignored the essence of the Zionist project that was based on the removal of the Palestinians.  
 In Ten Myths About Israel, Pappé explains that historical disinformation promoted 
oppression and protected a regime of colonialism and occupation. He argues that “the Western 
mainstream media and political elites accept this set of myths as a given truth, as well as the 
justification for Israeli actions across the last sixty or so years.”29  
Urban Palestinians were not the only ones expelled by the Israelis. Palestinian 
Bedouins suffered the same fate. Morris shows how the Palestinian Bedouins experienced 
discrimination, by the Zionists.  He illustrates that there existed a split in Palestinian society, 
between settled communities and the Bedouins. He states that each looked down upon the 
other. According to Morris, the Zionists faced a problem in South Palestine in 1948: as seen 
from the Israeli perspective, “there were two basic approaches…the Bedouin were 
congenitally unreliable and unruly, had sided with the Arabs during the war…as well as they 
were “incorrigible smugglers and thieves. It was best that they clear or be cleared out of the 
area.”30 
The Negev Brigade in 1948 harassed the Negev Bedouins and carried out a full-
scale clearing operation in the area. Morris explains that the Negev Brigade demolished the 
town of Beersheba, and residents were expelled, leaving town by foot and in busses. They left 
towards Hebron following repeated IAF bombing. According to Morris, the Bedouins in the 
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Negev area were dispersed and expelled; in addition, their homes were blown up.31  In The 
Birth of Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, Morris shows the violence that was creating 
the violence to force the Bedouins to flee. By proving the expulsion of Palestinians during the 
making of the Israeli State, Morris contrasted the traditional Israeli narrative, which explains 
that the neighboring Arab countries were responsible for the Palestinian flight.  Morris was 
dependent on archival material for his analysis and avoided the oral history that is still 
available through Palestinian refugees.  
In 1896, Theodor Herzl, a Hungarian journalist who is known as the father of 
modern political Zionism, wrote Der Judenstaat or The State of the Jews. Herzl’s book 
became the manifesto for the Zionist movement. Herzl believed that the best place for a 
Jewish homeland would be in Palestine.32 Pappé mentions that in 1897, the socialist Zionist, 
Nahman Syrkin said, “Palestine must be evacuated for the Jews.” Regarding the Bedouins, the 
Ottoman Empire not only oppressed the Bedouins, but the reality he argues can be best 
understood when put into a wider historical perspective that started in 1882 with the arrival of 
the first Zionist settlers in Palestine.33 After 1900, the Ottoman regime of land and ownership 
rights allowed Bedouin tribes to own land, regulate the grazing area, and systematize water 
access and rights 
According to Pappé, Bedouin life did not change much in the nineteenth century 
and the first half of the twentieth century. He claims that the main event in the Palestinian 
Bedouin history had been during the Egyptian rule of Palestine between the years 1831-1840. 
Pappé explains that this period allowed the Bedouins to frequent Palestine from bases in the 
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Sinai Peninsula, and they continued to make their presence felt, especially after the Ottomans 
returned to power in 1840. The Ottomans set the boundaries of tribal territories, which began 
the process of “sedentarization” that continued during the British Mandate. However, his 
approach to the history of the Bedouins differs from the other scholars; he explains that such a 
historical myth exposes the ideological context in which the Zionist attitudes and later Israeli 
policies towards the Bedouins in the Negev after the creation of Israel in 1948.   In 1896, 
Theodor Herzl, Hungarian Journalist who is known as the father of modern political Zionism 
wrote “ Der Judenstaat” or “The State of the Jews.” Herzl’s book became the manifesto for 
the Zionist movement. Herzl sought for a Jewish homeland and he believed that since the last 
time a Jewish kingdom existed in Jerusalem, Palestine could be the homeland for the Jewish 
people.34 Pappé mentions that in 1897, the socialist Zionist, Nahman Syrkin said, “ Palestine 
must be evacuated for the Jews.”35 In 1905, The British author who was in a close associate of 
Theodor Herzl said, “Jews must drive out the Arabs.” 36  
According to Israeli historian Pappé, since the birth of the Jewish state in 1948, the 
Palestinian people have suffered from the Zionist policy of “ethnic cleansing” and the 
subsequent colonization and settlement of their land.  The Zionist movement established a 
Jewish State in Palestine at the expense of the indigenous population.37 In addition, he argues 
that the Israeli government’s policy aimed to Judaize the land of Palestine and provide 
housing for the influx of new Jewish immigrants from Europe.38 The first waves of Zionist 
settlers came between 1882-1900, and the second wave arrived between 1905-1918. Pappé 
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explains, “[T]hey did not come to exploit, they came to redeem what they considered to be an 
ancient homeland.”39 The ethnic cleansing came in different forms.    
During and following the 1948 war, Israel imposed military government on the 
Palestine and the Palestinians. For over 65 years, the Bedouins witnessed massacres, 
destruction and displacement. After the eviction of most of the cities and villages in the 
Naqab, the Israeli forces turned the land into recreation parks and Jewish settlements.40 
Similar to Pappé and Morris, Shlaim has also concentrated on challenging the old Zionist 
narrative of the making of the Israeli state. He focuses on the kings of Jordan and goes in 
depth into their role in the making of Israel, challenging the old narrative myth that states the 
Palestinians left their homes voluntarily. Although, Morris, Shlaim, and Pappé challenged the 
traditional Israeli narrative, they all represent three distinct perspectives best described by a 
Palestinian historian Nur Masalha, “The right wing racist colonizer, the liberal colonizer, and 
the anti-Zionist de-colonizer.”41  Masalha, is a Palestinian historian. Currently a member of 
the Center for Palestine Studies, SOAS, University of London. His books include A Land 
without People, The Expulsion of the Palestinians, and Palestine: A Four Thousand-Year 
History.  According to Masalha, Morris’s challenge to the Israeli Myths regarding the forced 
expulsion of the Palestinians in 1948  “ended up by providing a neocolonial moral rational for 
the dispossession of the Palestinians.” 42 
   Although the New Historians brought a challenge to the old Israeli narrative and 
proved their point with the archival material that they had their hands on only in the end of the 
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1980s, their narrative was not new to the Palestinian scholars and historians who wrote about 
the expulsion of the Palestinians. In 1987, Khalidi in his “All That Remains: The Palestinians 
Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948.” documented the history of Palestine 
and the depopulation of 418 Palestinian villages.  
Palestinian Scholar, Salman Abu Sitta, born in 1937, in al Naqab spent forty years 
of his life documenting the 1948 Palestinians; his work illustrates that the return of the 
refugees to their home is not only sacred, but legal and possible. The mass expulsion of 
Palestinians in 1948 forced him and his family to leave their home in Beersheba, Negev, and 
Abu Sitta writes about his personal experiences, which allows us to understand what really 
took place during the 1948 war.  
Edward Said, a Palestinian American was a professor of literature at Columbia 
University, a public intellectual, and a founder of academic field of post- colonial studies. In 
1979.  Said wrote The question of Palestine where he mentions the Zionists terror against the 
Palestinians in 1948. He explains that Menachen Begin who was the leader of Zionist militant 
group Irgun admitted in his book the Revolt that he was part of the Deir Yassin village 
massacre. Said said, “Begin in his book, described his terrorism- including the whole sale 
massacre of innocent women and children- in righteous (and chilling) profusion. He admits to 
being responsible for the April 1948 massacre of 250 women and children in the Arab village 
of Deir Yassin.” 43 
Nur Masalha new book, Palestine: A Four Thousand Year History adds to the new 
historian narrative and reveals in his book that the concept of Palestine and its history is 
rooted firmly in ancient time and the old Zionist narrative is an invention.   
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Despite the scholarly work by the New Historians, the Palestinian oral history seems to be 
absent in the scholarly historical records. There are many reasons for the absence of 
Palestinian archives, and Palestinian voices in scholarly work.  During the 1948 war, soldiers 
robbed numerous bookstores and documents from homes44. In 1982 Israeli troops looted the 
research center of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Beirut. According to a New York 
Times article, the Israelis looted an entire library, which consisted of 25,000 volumes in 
Arabic, English and Hebrew; in addition, microfilms, manuscripts and archives.45 Salim 
Tamari, professor of sociology at Birzeit University and the director of the Institute of 
Jerusalem Studies explained that there is no Palestinian archives because they have been 
subjugated and controlled.  He explained that the Arab culture concept of writing history has a 
different style then the West. The Arab historiography was not based on archival material but 
mostly depends on oral sources. Tamari explained that although Palestinians are out of the 
historical record they have independent researchers not necessary professional historians. For 
example, village history books written in Arabic are available and published by formal 
resident, but they don’t make it into the global academy.46 
The Palestinian scholars and historians relied heavily on memories and oral history 
through testimonies from refugees in the diaspora. The reason the Palestinian historians did 
not use archival material in their earlier studies of the 1948 war and the Palestinian expulsion 
was because Palestinians lacked archival material. In addition, the history of the Palestinian 
Bedouins, is still absent from their scholarly books. 
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          Like the Israeli New Historians and other scholars, my research and findings challenge 
the Zionist narrative regarding the expulsion of the Palestinians in 1948. I do so using oral 
history. Unlike previous scholars who worked in archives, I interviewed Palestinians who are 
now living in the West Bank after being expelled from the Naqab by the Zionist in 1948. I 
collected their stories over the six years of field work- 2012-2018. 
My aim is to hear the voice of the minorities, the Bedouins, to understand and 
examine the reality that took place in the lives of the colonized. The oral history is needed to 
add marginalized voices and perspectives to this narrative regarding the ongoing forced 
expulsion. Palestinian Bedouins have been unfavorably affected by occupation policies of 
forced resettlement, urbanization, and demolition of their homes by the state of Israel. 
Despite the similarities that the New Historians and the Palestinian historians have in 
bringing new material and new perspectives from archival documents and oral histories to 
challenge the traditional, the story of the Palestinian Bedouins has not been told. This is my 
unique contribution to the literature: I document and record a new voice, the voice of the 




















Bedouins in Historical Palestine  
 
                  Most of the extensive scholarly literature on the Israel-Palestine conflict does not 
focus on or even mention the Palestinian Bedouins in the West Bank. This chapter examines 
and illustrates what various scholars who are considered experts in the modern history of the 
Naqab Bedouin wrote. I will review the different approaches and conceptualizations adopted 
by researchers as they have engaged with the Bedouins in the Naqab. NGO’s have carried 
out research on the Naqab Bedouins, but focused on studies that dealt with current events 
and the Israeli occupation.  Since they only focused on current issues they did not aim to be 
comprehensive works and did not enter into a detailed discussion of the Bedouin conditions 
before 1948. This chapter looks particularly at the history of Bedouins in historical Palestine 
during the Ottoman period, English mandate to the creation of the Israeli state. I argue that 
these three periods played a role in reshaping the Bedouin society. In order to adequately 
understand the current situation of Area C and the Bedouin forced displacement, it is crucial 
to start the story from the beginning- sixty-five years ago- when destruction and cultural 
cleansing of a way of life that lasted for centuries started and still continues today.  
 
Bedouins in Palestine: During Ottoman Empire 
 Although the Ottoman Empire controlled Palestine from 1516 until the end of 
World War I, not much was written or found in archives regarding the Bedouins in the 
Naqab until 1900. However, Mansour Nasasra, a scholar of Middle East politics and 
international relations at the Department of Politics at the University of Exeter explains that 
the Ottoman era in Palestine (1516-1917) is remembered by the Naqab Bedouins as a tough 
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and oppressive. It left them antagonistic towards Istanbul because of Ottoman policies 
against them that affected their way of life. Nasasra based his research on Israeli and 
British archives, interviews with Israeli officials who governed the Bedouins during the 
1950s and 1960s, and also deep interviews with Bedouins from the Naqab. He argues that 
during the late Ottoman period the Bedouins clashed with the Ottoman officials because of 
land ownership and taxes. The harsh treatment of the Bedouins in the Naqab by the 
Ottomans led to complaints and protests.47   
 Contrary to what Nasasra explains, Ismael Abu Saad, professor of education policy 
and administration in the Department of Education and founding director of the Center for 
Bedouin Studies and Development at Ben-Gurion University, and Cosette Creamer, 
professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, argue that the Bedouins in the 
Naqab during the control of the Ottomans from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century 
enjoyed their relative autonomy, freedom of movement, and use of land; in addition, they 
say that the Bedouin tribes spread throughout the territory where they grazed their flocks, 
covering hundreds of square miles, which the Bedouin tribes controlled, and each tribe 
selected its own sheikh.48   
 According to Israeli historian Ilan Pappé Bedouin life did not change much in the 
nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. Similar to Pappé, Oren 
Yiftachel, professor of urban studies and political geography at Gurion University explains 
that for decades the Ottoman land laws did not impact the lifestyle of the Bedouins living 
in Palestine. He explains that the traditional forms of Bedouin Arab land possession and 
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ownership was usually agreed upon verbally or through documents signed by neighboring 
tribes.  
               I met Sheikh Abu Fahed from al Jahalin tribe in Beit Iksa in October 2016. He 
explained that he was displaced from Al Naqab with his family in 1950. He expressed his 
wishes to go back in time when the Bedouins lived like sultans during the Ottomans despite 
that difficulties they felt at the time.  He explained regardless of the oppression during the 
Ottoman period it does not compare with today’s situation. He said, “ My family, the Al 
Dahouk family, has Turkish documents that prove that my family owned 360,000 dunnms 
in al Negev. 
               Bedouins farmed their land, and they milked their goats. They were too far from 
the urban areas and did not need them anyway. In 1950, when the Bedouins were expelled 
and displaced from al Negev, they settled in the West Bank. UNRWA did not care for them 
and treated them as third-class citizens. Although Sheikh Abu Fahed explained that the 
Bedouin culture was not under threat during the Ottoman Empire many scholars expressed 
other way. The Ottoman Empire viewed the Bedouins as a threat to state control. For 
example, one Turkish governor said, “On many occasions they abused the trust that the 
state placed in them, they stole state money, and they unlawfully seized public property, 
and thus they enriched themselves at the expense of peasantry and the state.”49 This is an 
example that the sultans used to justify their control and suppression of the Bedouins. 
 Focusing on the period from 1900 until 1917, Nasasra explains how the late 
Ottoman era in Palestine marked a new era in Turkish attempts to integrate and control the 
Naqab Bedouins.50 Because of the difficulties of controlling the Bedouin societies, the 
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Ottomans started to put more effort into settling the Bedouins around a new administrative 
center. In 1900, the Ottoman government purchased land in the Naqab from the Azazmah 
tribe to build the city of Beersheba.51 The government established the city of Beersheba as 
a small urban service center in order to better control the Bedouin tribes and to strengthen 
its presence. According to Yiftachel, Beersheba remained a small Arab town of 5,000 to 
6,000 inhabitants until 1948. The town became a target for Israeli efforts to settle, develop, 
and Judaize the desert after the creation of the state of Israel.52  
  Other scholars such as Richard Ratcliffe, an anthropologist, and Mansour Abu 
Rabia, professor of Middle East politics at Exeter University argue that the reason for the 
Ottomans to establish the city of Bir’ as-Saba,’, as a permanent administrative city was to 
put an end to inter-tribal confrontation and to benefit from tax collection from the Bedouin 
tribes.53 Communal tribal codes and rights were oral agreements.54 By agreeing on their 
borders through oral agreements with their neighboring tribes, Bedouins knew their borders 
and what belonged to them. For this reason, some Bedouins did not register for land deeds. 
In 1856, the Ottomans enacted a land law as part of the Tanzimat, a modernization 
program, that classified the land into five categories: mulk or private land, miri or land for 
agriculture or pasturage, waqf or lands of the Muslim religious institutions, matruka or land 
for public purposes such as public roads, and mawat or waste lands (“dead” or uncultivated 
                                                        
51 Amara, Abu-Saad,Yiftachel Oren,ed. Indigenous (In) justice,21. 
52 Champagne and Abu Saad, The Future of  Indigenous, 30.  
53 Chapter one Richard Ratcliffe, Mansour Nasasra, Sarab Abu-rabia-Queder and Sophie Richter-Devroe, 
“Introduction,’ in The Naqab Bedouin and Colonialism: New Perspective,” ed,  Mansour Nasasra and S 
Richter-Devroe, Sarab Abu-Rabia-Queder, and Richard Ratcliffe( New York: Routledge Taylor &Francis 
Group, 2015),4. 
54 Emily McKee, Dwelling in Conflict:Negev Landscapes and the Boundaries of Belonging (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press,2016), 48. 
 36 
land) which no one owned.55  The only owner of the mawat would be the sultan, who 
retained its ownership. The majority of land in the Naqab was considered to be mawat. The 
roots of this classification are found in the Ottoman Land Code of 1858.56 The lands taken 
by the Ottoman government were considered to be government property or under its 
control and administration. Ottoman rule permitted those using the land to work it 
according to laws that included paying taxes and receiving permission from the state for 
every transaction.57 
 According to Abu Saad and Creamer, the Ottomans set the boundaries of tribal 
territories, which began the process of “sedentarization” that continued during the British 
Mandate.58  Seth Frantzman, a Jerusalem-based commentator on Middle East politics and 
Ruth Kark, Israeli scholar and professor of geography at the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem, argue that “the Ottoman land law, the penetration of the country by other 
groups, modernization of agriculture, the use of Ottoman and mandatory state policing 
powers, and the extension of new technologies curtailed greatly the presence and influence 
of the Bedouin.”59 Frantzman and Kark argue that many poems and the oral history of the 
Bedouins in the Naqab express the complaints about the British taxation and Zionist land 
purchases. For example, one of the poems states, “wall surrounds all the land we’ve been 
on. Already they’re taxing our land everywhere, even figs, watermelon.” Another poem 
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expresses the anger over the sale of Bedouin land for Jewish settlement.60 One poem 
recited in 1970s explains what the Bedouins viewed as invasion of their land by the British 
and the Zionists; the Bedouins hoped that the intrusions would be temporary, speaking of 
“the Lord who lets strangers go back to their land, like the waves he lets roll to and fro.”61 
What the poems present is typical of what the Bedouins viewed as intrusion in their 
landscape by the Ottomans, British and the Zionists prior to the establishment of the Israeli 
state in 1948.  
              A documentary film by Ben Loeterman titled, 1913: Seeds of Conflict explores the 
divergent social forces growing in Palestine before World War I. The film starts by 
showing the first dispute between the newly arrived European Jews, who were part of the 
first Aliyah ( Jewish immigration to Historical Palestine )(1881-1903). This group of 
European Jews created small villages of independent farmers called moshauot twenty-five 
kilometers south of Jaffa. The moshauot were built on land inhabited by Palestinian 
Bedouins who cultivated the land for centuries. The thirty-two families that lived on the 
land were loyal subjects of the Ottoman Empire. The Russian settlers claimed the land and 
asked the Bedouins to leave. The Bedouins pleaded their case to the sultan in Turkey; 
however, this was insignificant. The Ottoman Empire’s concern was receiving taxes, and if 
the Russian Jews paid taxes to them they saw no problem.  The Ottoman Empire ignored 
the Bedouins’ rights of the land that they lived on for centuries.62  
             The Ottomans argued that clashes and small battles between the Bedouin tribes 
caused poverty and a decrease in government revenue. This gave the Ottomans the right to 
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remedy the lack of state power and what they viewed as theft of government resources. 
Unfortunately, few scholars have written about the Bedouins’ perspective. Several Bedouin 
poems written down over the years describe the Turks as foreigners to the land.  In the 
poetry, the Ottomans are criticized for being severe; government by bayonet (hukm be-
sanja) is still a common phrase that the Bedouins use to describe the Ottoman period.63 
Further, Frantzman and Kark focus on the later years of the Ottoman rule in Palestine. They 
argue that the Ottoman polices during that time affected the Bedouin inhabitants who went 
from being dominant players in the rural environment to a totally marginalized group.                 
             According to Frantzman and Kark, “the extension of Ottoman government power 
and changes strove to mitigate strife between clans and groups in order to keep the settled 
population at peace and the environment agriculturally productive.”64 Frantzman and Kark 
agree that the “discrimination against the Bedouins proved inherent in the system and did 
not necessarily come from capriciousness by the local officials.”65  Most of the scholars 
argue that the Ottomans controlled the Bedouins through oppression; however, in certain 
cases they failed to achieve any significant control over the Bedouins in the Naqab.  
 
Bedouins in Palestine under the British Mandate 
             Although the Bedouins lived on the land in the Naqab for centuries, some of them 
did not own the land. During the British mandate in Palestine, the government reissued the 
Ottoman Land Code as the Mawat Land Ordinance in 1921. According to Yiftachel, the 
intention of reissuing of the mawat law was different than how the Ottomans viewed it. The 
British law did not have the same intent as the Ottomans. Instead of encouraging land 
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reclamation and acquisition by the cultivator, it served to consolidate land in the hands of 
the government. The British gave the Bedouin landholders and cultivators of mawat two 
months to register cultivated mawat land in their names. However, at the end of the given 
period, holders who did not register lost their right to cultivate their land. This land became 
classified as “state land.”66  During the period of the British Mandate, many of the 
Bedouins in the Naqab settled in small villages or towns. And “the value of land rose as 
farming increased and tribal sheikhs bought land on which they employed tribesmen as 
sharecroppers.”67 Abu-Saad and Creamer state that the total number of Bedouins in the 
Naqab during the British mandate ranged from 65,000 to 100,000 with tribes recognizing 
each other’s land.68  
                The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 established that mawat lands were not owned 
by anyone because they were considered wastelands. The British authorities recognized 
ownership of land by the Bedouins, and collected taxes from them.69 But since most of the 
Bedouin lands during the British Mandate were not registered at the land registry office, the 
government classified the land as mawat land. The Bedouins had not registered because the 
fear of the burden of government taxes coupled with the fear of revealing details of private 
property. There were several longstanding reasons for not registering land: the old Bedouin 
tradition of not cooperating with a foreign government authorities, the lack of education or 
knowledge of the importance of registering their land, to stay away from taxation and 
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military conscription, indifference towards administrative process, and the feelings of 
having been marginalized.70   
               However, during the British Mandate, some of the Bedouins in the Naqab 
continued with their lifestyle and cultivated their lands almost without interference. “The 
British saw the Bedouins in the Naqab as a problem in their administrative framework, 
even as some British officials worked with the intentions to defend the Bedouin land 
claims.”71 Beersheba remained the main economic center for the settled Bedouins in the 
Naqab. Nasasra argues that the British recognized the traditional power structure, and 
British policies towards the tribes relied heavily on strengthening the role of traditional 
tribal leaders.72 The British tried to avoid enforcing their laws and allowed Bedouins to 
continue with their norms and customs; in addition, a common British policy was to 
encourage the Bedouins to be part of the Beersheba administrative system. For example, by 
employing the Bedouins on advisory councils, appointing them into police forces and 
establishing tribal courts, the British indirectly ruled the Bedouin communities in the 
Naqab.73  
  
Bedouins in Palestine after 1948 
              Emily McKee, who based her research on extensive fieldwork, explains that many 
Jewish Israelis claim that the Bedouins are lawbreakers and unincorporated members of the 
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nation-state because they are not Jewish.74 Yiftachel, whose main research explores the 
links between ethno-national politics and urban and regional polices, explains that the 
control over minorities such as the Bedouins in the Naqab is often associated with a 
relatively firm territorial order of exclusion, segregation, and ghettoization, with extreme 
control over what the state claims to be state land. In 1950, thousands of the Azazmeh 
tribesmen were forced to leave Israel for the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt. In 1952, the Israeli 
army expelled 850 members of the Al-Sani tribe from northern Naqab, driving them into 
the West Bank and Jordan. The notorious Unit 1 of the Israeli army, under the chief of staff 
Moshe Dayan, massacred the Azazmeh tribe, including women and children, in 1953. 
These expulsions reduced the Bedouin population from 65,000-95,000 at the end of the 
British Mandate to 13,000 by 1951.75  
                    The Israeli government enacted a number of laws and military regulations to 
enable the State to confiscate land previously owned or used by the Bedouins. By 
concentrating the Bedouins in closed areas and reducing their land base, and registering 
their land as State property the Bedouins lost their livelihood.76 Safa Aburabia states that 
immediately after the 1948 war, the Bedouins were transferred onto reservations that Israel 
defined as closed military areas. The Bedouins lived under restriction of movement, which 
severed them from their land by preventing them from returning to it or cultivating it.77  
                  Due to the Israeli military rules imposed on the Bedouins in the Negev in the 
early 1950s, once the Bedouins were displaced and expelled and could not return to their 
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land, they were isolated from the Palestinian population that lived in Israel. If they needed 
to work or visit a family member, they needed special permits to leave the restricted area. 
Masalha explains that in May 1950, the Israeli army transported Palestinians from their 
villages in crowded trucks to a point near Wadi Araba, a hot desert between the Dead Sea 
and the Gulf of Aqaba. The Palestinians were ordered to cross to Jordan, with the soldiers 
firing bursts over their heads to make them go forward and not return to their homes.78 
According to Ismael Abu- Saad and Cosette Creamer, “In 1953, the Land Acquisition Law 
retroactively endorsed expropriations undertaken directly after the 1948 conflict.”79 This 
Law came into being after the removal of most of the Bedouin in the Negev.  
                 Creamer and Abu Saad argue that this law provided the Israeli state with the 
right to register previously confiscated land. Despite the Bedouins’ rights and some of the 
ownership documents they possessed, the Israeli government forced the law and classified 
all Bedouin land as uncultivated and, hence, state-owned. This gave a legal justification to 
Israel to nationalize the land. In addition, Creamer and Abu Saad explain that of the 
original ninety-five Bedouin tribes in the Negev, only nineteen tribes remained and 
received official recognition. However, as a result of the Israeli land law, the Israeli 
authorities took full control of the Bedouin land and deprived the Bedouins of the freedom 
to migrate seasonally with their herds, and it became impossible for the Bedouins to 
cultivate their land. As a result twelve of the remaining nineteen Negev Bedouin tribes left 
their land, and the entire population of the Bedouins was confined to a specially designated, 
restricted area in the northeastern Negev.80  
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               As late as 1959, Bedouin tribes were expelled from the Negev to Sinai in Egypt 
and Jordan. Some tribes were expelled to the West Bank in areas near Jerusalem, 
Bethlehem, and Hebron. It is also important to note that the thousands of the expelled 
Bedouins who became refugees in the West Bank couldn’t return, in part because two new 
laws legalized the displacement of the Bedouins and the confiscation of their land. The 
1950 Absentee Property Law and the 1953 Land Acquisition Law justified the land 
confiscation. Salman Abu Sitta, best known for his crucial mapping work on Palestine and 
his work on the Palestinian Right of Return, explains that the other factor that made it hard 
for the 1948 Palestinian refugees in the West Bank to go back to their homes and land was 
that the refugees did not have freedom under Jordanian rule. Abu Sitta explains that the 
Palestinian who were expelled to the West Bank during the 1948 war “were absorbed into 
the expanded Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Jordanian regime harshly suppressed any 
political movement by the refugees to claim back their homes in Palestine, although 
(Jordanian) official media trumpeted adherence to the “sacred Arab rights” in Palestine.”81 
Amnon Neumann, an Israeli veteran who fought in the Negev during the 1948 war 
said in a 2015 interview for the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs magazine, “ The 
Bedouins in the Naqab had put up almost no resistance to advancing Jewish forces because 
they lacked “a military capacity” and had no weapons. The Israeli army terrified the 
Bedouin villages out of their homes by shooting either at them, or above their heads. We 
drove them out, women and children went to Gaza, by the morning there was nobody there. 
We burned their houses.”82 The Palestinians were completely unprepared for war. Masalha 
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explains that the Palestinian leadership during the 1948 war was still in disarray and largely 
unarmed as a result of the 1936-39 rebellion. 
  This continuation of expulsion was part of the Zionist agenda to de-Arabize the 
region and to Judaize it.83 In addition to passing new laws such as the Land Seizure Law of 
1950 and the Absentee Properties Law of 1953, the Israeli authorities adopted two laws 
practiced during the Ottoman period and the British mandate. These laws worked in 
Israel’s favor: the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 defined most of the Naqab as state land, and 
the British mandatory land law of 1921, denied the Bedouins their land due to their failure 
to register. These laws classified all Bedouin lands in the Negev as uncultivated and 
consequently State owned.84 According to Masalha, in 1970, Moshe Dayan, Minister of 
Defense at the time, and Ariel Sharon, military officer at the time, established a program to 
evict the Bedouins who had settled in northern Sinai. Thousands of Bedouins were evicted 
from their land and replaced by new Jewish settlements. The Bedouins in Sinai appealed to 
the Israeli Supreme Court in 1972 to be able to return to their homes and called for a stop to 
the eviction and displacement by police, but the court rejected their appeal. The eviction of 
the Bedouins was justified as a national security issue.85 During this time, Dayan was also 
working on evicting thousands of Bedouin farmers from Gaza Strip. Masalha states that the 
“forcible eviction of the Bedouin communities and the replacement of the Jewish 
settlements represented one example of the ideology of force, which reached its apogee 
between the 1967 war and the October war of 1973.”86  
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 Similar to Pappé, Noam Chomsky, an American philosopher, linguist, and historian, 
explains that in 1972, the Israeli military forces under General Ariel Sharon, “drove off 
some ten thousand farmers and Bedouins, bulldozed or dynamited their homes, pulled 
down their tents, destroyed their crops and filled in their wells, to prepare the ground for 
the establishment of six kibbutzim, nine villages, and the city of Yamit.”87 The creation of 
a new map of the Negev was possible only after the ethnic cleansing of the Bedouins took 
place. Just after the 1948 war, Israeli archaeologists and members of the Israeli Exploration 
Society focused on creating the new map of the occupied Negev. The first thing they did 
was to change  all the Arabic names of the towns, areas, and landscape to Hebrew names. 
According to Masalha, 561 different geographical features in the Negev—mountains, 
valleys, springs, and waterholes that once had Arabic Palestinian names were changed to 
biblical Hebrew names. For example, Seil Imran became Nahal Amran and Jabal Dibba 
(Hump Hill) became Har Dla’at (Mount Pumplein). 88 Nasasra explains that the Israeli 
attempts at modernization and development were predominantly a policy aimed at the 
Bedouins. Bedouins resisted the government plans by continuing to live in their historical 
land.89  
 Similar to Nasasra Israeli scholars of the Naqab Bedouin, Yuval Karplus and 
Avinoam Meri, argue that Bedouin urbanization commenced during the late 1960s as the 
Israeli government started an extensive project to resettle the Bedouins in a number of 
small towns in order to enhance modernization and social change to encourage 
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urbanization.90 According to Pappé “what Israel calls urban planning is actually ethnic 
cleansing.”91 Masalha explains that in 1976 the Israeli authorities had removed more than 
thirty Bedouin settlements. A few years later, in 1978, Ariel Sharon, then the Agriculture 
Minister, declared the entire area as a protected nature reserve. The Bedouins became 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Bedouins:  Between the Green Line and the E1 Plan  
 
 Traditionally the Bedouins have subsisted by farming and raising herds, but 
Bedouin social life dramatically shifted due to Israeli military rule. As Pappé argues, 
against the tactics of “ethnic cleansing,” the Bedouins struggled for equality, recognition, 
and social justice.  “The Israeli state forced urban plans upon the Bedouin communities and 
the formation of urban Bedouin spaces was planned by the Israeli state to serve 
“hegemonic spatial interests that were in collision with Bedouin traditional agro-pastoral 
semi-nomadic tribal spatiality.”93 Their livelihood was broken once the Israelis displaced 
them from their land and gathered them in a closed military area northeast of Beer-Sheva 
called the “Siyag,” or fence. There was no return to the homes and villages that they had 
lived in for centuries. The Siyag was on land that was known for its low agricultural 
fertility. Twelve Bedouin tribes were relocated to the Siyag, joining six tribes who already 
lived there. The Bedouins in the Siyag were under military control until 1966. They were 
not allowed to build any stone or concrete homes or buildings. The Bedouins ended up 
living in shacks and tents. Because of the lack of fertile land space for grazing in the Siyag, 
Bedouins began to seek unfamiliar employment and jobs in Israel.94  
                  This Chapter examines the Bedouins in Historical Palestine and focusing on the 
Jahalin Bedouin tribe in Eastern Jerusalem. The Israeli policy of ethnic cleansing has been 
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implemented against the Palestinian Bedouins since the creation of the state of Israel in 
1948. I argue that the Israeli displacement plan in the name of urbanization in the West 
Bank and in East Jerusalem, the Oslo accord agreement between the Israeli government 
and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and the E1-Plan are the continuation of 
ethnic and culture cleansing of the Bedouins of Palestine. Moreover, After meeting with 
many Bedouins from the Jahalin tribe, I found that the Israeli plan is to de-Arabize and 
empty the land of its inhabitants and in this case the Jahalin tribe in eastern Jerusalem to 
allow the expansion of illegal Jewish settlements in addition to build new ones.   
                   The Israeli displacement plan against the Jahalin Bedouins in the name of 
urbanization displaced the Jahalin to Abu Dis, a nearby village that is next to the garbage 
dump just to allow the expansion of Mal’e Adumim settlement. I argue that the expansion 
of Male Adumim and connecting it to Jerusalem dashes hope for the two state solution and 
the Palestinian right for self-determination.  
 This Chapter focuses on interviews I conducted between the years 2012-2018 with 
six Bedouin communities that all belong to al Jahalin tribe: Al Jib, Jabal al Baba, Khan al 
Ahmar, Abu Dis, Nabi Samuel, Beit Iksa, and Sateh Al Bather. Although the Jahalin 
Bedouins opposed the displacement plan they were forced to move next to a garbage dump 
in Abu Dis. The forced urbanization on the Bedouins ended a way of life that survived for 
centuries.  
 
The Green Line 
 The 1967 border known as the Green Line is the former Jordanian-Israeli armistice 
line separates the West Bank from Israel. On both sides of the line two Palestinian Bedouin 
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communities, al Jahalin Bedouin tribe and al Turi  Bedouin tribe. Although, originated 
from the Naqab in historical Palestine a “Green Line” sometimes visible and sometimes is 
not visible on the maps, separates them. In an article published in the New York Times on 
September 6, 2011, Isabel Kershner states that the Green Line was named for the green 
marker with which it was drawn on the map during the 1948 Armistice agreement. It refers 
to the border that separates the occupied Palestinian territory (the West Bank, East 
Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip) from the State of Israel. Despite the reality of the existence of 
the Green Line for many years, and still recognized in treaties with Jordan and Egypt as the 
Israeli boundary, Israel continued colonizing the West Bank. In 1967 Israel occupied the 
West Bank from the Jordanians who occupied the West Bank from 1948-1967.  
                     Although Jordan relinquished claim on the West Bank in 1974 when the Arab 
League recognized the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the representative of 
the Palestinian people. The West Bank was still occupied by Israel and the Israelis did not 
recognize the PLO, nor the existence of the Palestinians, until 1993. Since 1967 the West 
Bank has been under the Israeli military occupation.  Nazmi al-Jubeh, a Palestinian 
historian explained that “if the Israelis do not recognize this line, it means that they do not 
recognize the territory beyond it as occupied.”  Pappé says that the Green Line is slowly 
disappearing because Israeli policies of ethnic cleansing.95   
  According to the United Nations Commission, ethnic cleansing is a crime against 
humanity. In The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Pappé defined Ethnic Cleansing as “An 
effort to render an ethnically mixed country homogenous by expelling a particular group of 
people and turning them into refugees while demolishing the homes they were driven out 
from. There may well be a master plan, but most of the troops engaged in ethnic cleansing 
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do not need direct order: they know beforehand what is expected of them. Massacres 
accompany the operation, but where they occur they are not part of a genocidal plan: they 
are a key tactic to accelerate the flight of population earmarked for expulsion.”96  Pappé 
suggests that the Ethnic Cleansing is not about planned idea, but an operation that at in the 
end of which one ethnic group is displaced and replaced with another. 
 The ethnic cleansing came in different forms and actions such as massacres, 
destruction and displacement. The Green Line not only separates the Palestinians from 
Palestinians, but it created different classes of Palestinians. Al-Araqib, located in the 
Naqab, is one of many unrecognized villages that do not appear on Israeli maps or 
government planning documents. On the other side of the Green Line are the Jahalin 
Bedouin communities in the West Bank who originated from the Naqab prior to 1948. Both 
Bedouin tribes share the same story of struggle against displacement and home demolition. 
The Israeli authorities have threatened both communities to leave their land by constantly 
sending demolishing orders to their doors. While the threat is constant and the demolition 
of their homes has taken place multiple times, both communities continue to demonstrate 
against the displacement and express their steadfastness through peaceful demonstrations, 
rebuilding their homes, and continuing to live on their land despite the threats and the 
violence they endure from the Israeli authorities. 
 In a short documentary called From Al Araqib to Susiya, Adalah (The Legal Center 
for Arab Minority Rights in Israel) captures the stories of two Palestinian villages, Al-
Araqib and Susiya. A young Bedouin from Al-Araqib said, “We were surprised one day in 
1999 to wake up at 4 am to the sound of the airplanes sweeping over our village and 
spraying all crops and the entire village with a toxic substance called “Round Up,” a 
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chemical that kills all plants and living things. Most of our sheep died and my uncle also 
died because he inhaled the poison.”97 The Israeli government frequently demolished 
homes and sprayed toxic pesticides onto crops in the unrecognized villages in the Negev.98 
These villages do not have access to basic sanitation infrastructure so waste accumulates 
outside of Bedouin villages. These garbage piles became home to disease carrying pests, 
such as mosquitos, flies, dogs, and more. Some Bedouins choose to burn their waste and 
because they burn organic and inorganic waste together, a range of potent toxic chemicals 
cause major problems for the Bedouins including cancer and birth defects.99  
  On July 2010, the Israeli police destroyed the village just to make way for a Jewish 
National Fund forest. Masalha explains that the destruction of Al-Araqib was carried out by 
a 1,300 strong contingent of security forces, police, and civilian guards equipped with guns, 
stun grenades, and bulldozers. Masalha stated that even students from Jewish high schools 
participated in the destruction of Al-Araqib.100 In an Aljazeera article on the Al-Araqib 
demolishing (April 15, 2015), Jillian Kestler-D’Amours reported that hundreds of Israeli 
soldiers and police officers demolished dozens of homes and animal pens and uprooted 
thousands of olive trees in Al-Araqib. This Bedouin community is an example of the 
continuation of the ethnic cleansing in the Naqab. What happened to the Al-Araqib 
community and other Bedouins from the Naqab is similar to the process of expelling 
Native Americans from their land and putting them into reservations. Masalha explains 
that, “for Palestinians, mourning sixty-three years of Al Nakba is not just about 
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remembering the ethnic cleansing of 1948; it is also about marking the ongoing 
dispossession.”101  
 In March 2016, I met with Sheikh Sayyah Al Turi in his village al Araqib in Naqab. 
His children were playing around the rubbish and leftovers of their demolished houses. I 
had my camera and took some pictures while Shiekh Sayyah was on his phone. I saw the 
steadfastness of his family and their determination to stay on their land. Despite multiple 
demolitions and the daily harassment, they endure from the Israeli policy of displacement 
they continue to stay. This is what Sheikh Sayyah said to me: “We have the right to stay on 
this land; we own it; I have documents to show you.” He pointed to the wall in the guest 
tent where I was welcomed to sit with him and his family.  He said “Look at all theses 
documents on this wall. They are legal and showing that I am on my land and no one can 
take this right away from me.”  The documents were tax papers and proving his family’s 
ownership of the land since the Ottoman era. Sheikh Sayyah had made copies and prints, 
filling his guest room wall with all the documents like wallpaper, and he said that he made 
tens of copies of each to give his children and grandchildren for the future. 
  After the interview, Sheikh Sayyah walked with me around Al Araqib, and he 
pointed at the cemetery and said “Look at our cemetery. It is older than the state of Israel, 
dated from 1914.” Sheikh Sayyah believes that the Israeli ethnic cleansing began to move 
out non-Jews from particular areas in order to give the land to new Jewish settlements. He 
expressed his steadfastness and determination to stay on his land and vowed to continue to 
rebuild his village every time it is destroyed. He stated that the discrimination they endure 
from Israeli policy is just because they are Bedouins and Palestinians. They displaced us 
just for them to build new Jewish settlements.”  As a settler colonialist project, the settlers 
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must depopulate the land from its people to sustain their colonialist project.  Al Araqib 
village , is denied all infrastructure and adequate basic services; meanwhile, the new Jewish 
settlements on Bedouin land that was confiscated live with no problems.  According to 
Masalha, “Today there are 155,000 Palestinian Bedouins in the Naqab, many of whom 
have been repeatedly displaced since 1948; 83,000 of them live in “unrecognized villages” 
without electricity or running water and with no access of municipal or government 
assistance.”102  
 Similar to Al Araqib in Naqab, Khan Al Ahmar in the West Bank is facing similar 
threats and expulsions by the Israeli forces in order to de-Arabize the land. Israel’s 
planning and urbanization policy in the West Bank is aimed to prevent the Bedouins of 
Khan Al Ahmar from developing and cultivating their land. In both cases—at Al Araqib, 
the Bedouin village in the Naqab, and Khan Al Ahmar, the Bedouin village in the West 
Bank—Israel set its laws to prohibit any permanent structures and farming.  Several 
Bedouin explained to me from both communities that if caught farming or building a stone 
house they would be risking fines and home demolition. The Khan Al Ahmar village is a 
home for the Jahalin tribe, which was expelled from its home in the Naqab to the West 
Bank in 1950. Whether the Bedouin villages were inside the Green Line or outside of it, the 
villages were demolished multiple times to make way for the establishment of new Jewish 
settlements.   
 Since 1967, Israel has occupied the West Bank including Eastern Jerusalem. Under 
international law, occupation should be temporary, and the occupying power is prohibited 
from establishing any permanent facts on the occupied territory. The Fourth Geneva 
Convention forbids the occupying power to transfer its civilian population to the occupied 
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territory. This includes the establishment of Jewish settlements on privately owned 
Palestinian land. In addition, as part of the Geneva Convention, the occupying power has 
the duty to protect public and private property, but Israel breaches this duty by establishing 
more settlements and confiscating more land. 
  Chomsky states that all of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Eastern 
Jerusalem are illegal, as determined by the Security Council’s advisory opinion of the 
International Court of Justice.”103 “Land expropriation is probably the most significant 
aspect of the policy of deprivation pursed by Israel against the Palestinian minority.”104 
Pappé explains that ever since 1967, Israel has searched for a way to keep the West Bank 
under their occupation without granting rights to Palestinians. The expansion of the Israeli 
settlements and the continuous of occupation of the West Bank and Eastern Jerusalem took 
place while Israel participated in a “Peace Process” talks. I 1993. 105  Peace between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis will remain difficult as long as Israel’s approach to 
Palestinians’ property in the West Bank and Eastern Jerusalem continues to be confiscating 
privately owned land and expanding Jewish settlements.  
 
The Oslo Accords:  Vanishing of a Culture and State 
 The Oslo agreement signed by Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat in September 1993 
failed to resolve the essence of the Palestinian question. Although the majority of the 
Palestinians who were in exile or under occupation in the West Bank at a certain time 
claimed loyalty to what the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) stood for, the PLO 
changed its direction in terms of ending the occupation and solving the refugee question. 
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To the occupied Palestinians, the PLO meant national unity towards a common objective, 
the achievement of an independent statehood. During the Oslo Accords negotiations, 
Ghassan Khatib explains that the PLO’s concern shifted towards leadership status, and 
gaining the Israeli acceptance to negotiate with them. “To the Oslo negotiators, the PLO 
meant the individual leaders, status, and role of the organization. 106 The dilemma was that 
the outside leadership embarked on a peace process that gave them the opportunity to gain 
international awareness ignoring the reality inside the colonized West Bank and Gaza. The 
Oslo Accords ignored the essence and purpose of the Palestinian struggle.  
 The Israeli government recognized the PLO during the Olso Accords without 
recognizing the Palestinians’ goal of ending ongoing occupation in the West Bank, 
achieving an independent Palestinian state; ensuring the right of return of refugees; and 
stopping the expansion of the illegal settlements, land annexation, and human rights 
violations. Instead the Oslo Accords focused on symbols, control, and raising the status of 
the PLO in personal and institutional respects107  
 According to Masalha, discrimination against the Palestinians inside the state of 
Israel and in the Palestinian occupied territories (the West Bank) has “remained blatant and 
institutionalized.”108  What the Oslo Accords achieved was the division of what was 
already divided. The agreement divided the West Bank into three areas: A, B, and C. 
According to United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ 
Occupied Palestinian Territory Report, over 60 percent of the West Bank is considered 
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Area C, where Israel retains near exclusive control, including over law enforcement, 
planning, and construction.109   
 What followed the Oslo Accords in 1993-1995 was the expansion of Jewish 
settlements, which displaced Palestinians. Just five months after the Oslo agreement, the 
Israeli authorities continued with expansion of the settlements; construction for the 
settlement bypass roads for Jewish settlers continued, and expropriation of land did not 
stop. The construction of the Israeli settlements, housing, and infrastructure (in the 
occupied territories) has accelerated since Oslo I Accord was signed in September 1993, 
using funds provided by the US taxpayers with the agreement of the Bush and Clinton 
administrations.110   
 Between September 1994 and Spring 1995, the Israeli government approved seven 
hundred new homes at the Giva at Tal settlement and eight thousand new homes at the 
Ma’ale Adumim settlement in the West Bank near Jerusalem.111 According to a 2012 
United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ Occupied Palestine 
Territory Report, “Since 1967, Israel has established about 150 settlements (residential and 
others) in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, in addition to some 100 “outposts” 
erected by settlers without official authorization.”112  In 1996, the Bedouin Jahalin tribe lost 
most of their land for the expansion of Ma’ale Adumim  
 In October 2015, I met Eid Abu Ghalia and his family at his house in the village of 
Abu Dis. Abu Ghalia and his family were displaced from Khan Al Ahmar where Ma’ale 
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Adumim sits today. In the winter of 1997, the Israeli army and soldiers bulldozed Abu 
Ghalia’s and his family’s shelters. In an interview conducted with him, he explained that 
the displacement of the Jahalin Bedouins took place before, during, and after the Oslo 
agreement. He stated, “In 1979 the Israelis started building the Male’ Adumim settlement. 
The Israelis started an individual displacement plan. The reason was to make it less obvious 
to the Palestinian communities and the near by villagers as well as the media. The land was 
spacious and small families live in it, they went to them one by one and said, ‘We want to 
build here. Just move a little like 100 or 200 meters away that’s all’. They kept up these 
tactics and strategies of displacing the Bedouins until 1993.” According to Abu Ghalia, the 
Israeli authorities discriminated against the Bedouins and protected the settlements. He 
stated, 
When the confrontations started between the settlers and the Bedouins, 
the Bedouins protested against the shrinking of their land. I remember 
living in an area called Um Al Ghaleen and it is in the middle of the Ma’ 
ale Adumim. We used have around 200 goats. We did not need to be 
workers and search for jobs. Most of the Bedouins lived off of the 
livestock they owned. They were happy, but unfortunately, when the land 
started to shrink on them, and the Israelis forced them to leave the area, 
they went to the Israeli courts, but the Israeli courts were always on the 
settlers’ side. The courts ruled against the Bedouins and supported the 
displacement policy against the Bedouins.”  According to Abu Ghalia, 
the forced displacement brought poverty and family stress because of the 
increase of unemployment. He believes that the policy of displacement 
destroyed their culture and livelihood. The Bedouin lifestyle relies on 
raising livestock that needs pasture land to graze. The Jahalin Bedouin’s 
life is vanishing through the Israeli policies of displacement and 
urbanization leading to loss of their tradition and culture that has been in 
practice for centuries. Abu Ghalia said,  “They did offer an alternative, 
but what alternatives? God knows. Families who used to live on 40 to 50 
dunnums were offered an exchange of land that was 500 meters. The 500 
meters will not accommodate 200 goats. If you just put the goats by 
themselves this size will not be enough. In 1997 the Israeli court decided 
that even if it is by force the Bedouins needed to leave the land. In fact, 
one day the Israeli soldiers came with bulldozers, early morning, around 
8 am to displace us by force. Around 3000 soldiers surrounded the area 
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and divided us into three groups. They started with the first group I was 
in. They loaded everything, goats, food, flour, and all of our belongings 
and put everything in a container that is about 6m x 2m. Everything was 
on top of each other including the goats; they destroyed most of our 
belongings. They brought us here and threw everything in the container 
on a hill nearby. Then they did the same to the second group and to the 
third group.113 
 
  Abu Ghalia explained to me that the Bedouin culture is under threat of altogether 
vanishing. He said, “Now here is the problem: they changed our lifestyle. I never needed to 
learn a craft or needed to be professional in any job. I always was a Bedouin who relied on 
livestock, dairy products, and animal meat. The first problem we faced in the village was 
unemployment so we had to sell 80% of our livestock.” The home demolition and forced 
displacement affects the social, cultural, and economic system of the Bedouins, which 
forces the abandonment of a nomadic lifestyle and a search for alternative sources of 
income.    
  
Bedouins: Between Displacement and the Expansion of Settlements in Occupied 
Palestine  
 
 In 1948, the Jahalin Bedouins were forced to leave their home, Tel Ard, in the 
Naqab. Expelled from their land, the Jahalin developed a permanent community on land 
belonging to Palestinian villagers in the West Bank. According to a 2015 Norwegian 
Refugee Council Report, there are 30,000 Bedouins who live in different areas in the West 
Bank, near Jerusalem, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jericho, Khan Al Ahmar, Wadi Abu Hindi, 
Jordan Valley, Anata, Beir Nabala, and Abu Dis. These communities are known as Arab al 
Jahalin. Although the land in these areas are owned by the nearby villagers, the Bedouins 
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settled with their tents and animals and made a home on the basis of lease agreements with 
local Palestinian landowners. Abu Fahed, who lives in Beit Iksa with his family, explained 
to me that after the Jahalin were expelled from the Naqab, they became refugees and settled 
on privately owned Palestinian land. He said, “The land is owned by a Palestinian family, 
the Al Shear family. We have an agreement with them to live on their land.” The Jahalin 
had open access to the markets in Jerusalem and became very dependent on them to sell 
their products, which included meat, cheese, and yogurt.  After the occupation of the West 
Bank in 1967, the Jahalin Bedouins were exposed to another wave of displacement. The 
Occupation forces started to restrict the land inhabited by the refugee Bedouins. 
  Attalah Mazarah, who lives in Jebel Al Baba, explained that the land his family 
settled on after their expulsion from the Naqab is owned by Palestinian families. Attalah’s 
family made an agreement with the villagers to live on it. He said, “Palestinians privately 
own Jabal al Baba land. The owners are from a town called Al Azariah. The owners are 
still here and live in al-Azariah. The family names are Faroun, Khateeb, and Khalef. Some 
land is still under Jordanian rule.” The Bedouins lived a normal Bedouin life, their animals 
were well grazed, the land was farmed, and their movement was not interrupted until the 
late 1970s and the early 1980s, Attalah explained, when the Israelis started to build the 
second largest settlement in the West Bank, called Ma’ale Adumim. Building this 
settlement and the roads to connect it took so much from the Jabal al Baba land. Most of 
the land the Bedouins had for grazing was gone, which made it hard for them to maintain 
their livestock. Livestock is a major tradition for Bedouins, and they depend on it 
economically. According to a 2014 United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestine Territory (OCHA) report “most of Area C 
 60 
has been allocated for the benefit of Israeli settlements, which receive preferential 
treatment at the expense of Palestinian communities.”  
  The movement of the Jahalin Bedouins in area C is controlled, restricted, and 
considered under military rule, including the barrier wall and checkpoints. In 2002, the 
Israeli government approved construction of the segregation wall on land requisitioned 
from Palestinian landowners by the Israeli Ministry of Defense through military orders.114  
According to a 2014 OCHA report, 85% of the wall’s route runs inside the West Bank, and 
9.4% of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, will be isolated by the wall, and 150 
Palestinian communities have land located between the barrier and the Green Line. 115   
 By the early 1950s the Jahalin Bedouins had settled and continued their traditional 
pastoral lifestyle. However, after the occupation of the West Bank in 1967 their life 
changed. The Israeli government planned the removal of Bedouins from the area. In the 
late 1970s, the Israeli-built settlements covered the green hill where the Bedouin livestock 
used to graze. The Bedouins were forced to leave the land and empty it for the expansion of 
the settlements. Settlements such as Ma’ale Adumim, located in Area C, were included in 
the Israeli E1 plan. Khan Al Ahmar and Jabel al Baba are just two Bedouin communities in 
the West Bank. During my visits to the Jahalin communities between the years 2012-2018, 
I learned about the forced displacement and the Israeli settlement construction in E1 (E1 is 
short for East 1). The E1 plan is an Israeli policy to expand the Israeli settlement of Ma’ale 
Adumim in the West Bank in order to connect it with Jerusalem. The E 1 Plan seeks to cut 
off the narrow land corridor east of Jerusalem in order to divide and split the West Bank 
into two parts. This plan would not allow the Palestinians to have their contiguous state. 
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Despite the proof of Palestinian land ownership, the Israelis used the term “state land” as 
an excuse to expel the Bedouins.  
 According to a 2009 Bimkom and B’tselem report titled, “The Hidden Agenda: the 
Establishment and Expansion Plans of Ma’ale Adumim and their Human Rights 
Ramifications,” in 1975 the Israeli ministerial committee authorized the expropriation of 
3,000 hectares of the village land of Al Eizariyah, at-Tur, Issawiya, Anata, Khan al Ahmar, 
and Nabi Musa to build the Israeli settlement Ma’ale Adumim. The ownership of the 
confiscated land switched from individual Palestinians to the state forever.116 In October 
2015, I visited the Jahalin communities again only to learn that Bedouin communities in the 
Jerusalem area face daily assaults by the Israeli army and police. I met with Eid Abu 
Ghalia, a Jahalin. He was displaced from Khan al Ahmar and relocated to Abu Dis next to 
the garbage dump. Eid Abu Ghalia summarized the predicament of the Jahalin in this area: 
During the Six-Day War [1967], half of the Jahalin tribe moved to Jordan 
and the other half stayed in Khan al Ahmar where now Ma’ale Adumim sits. 
The site is named after a Byzantine monastery, and you can still see the 
ruins of Deir al Murssas; it’s in the middle of Ma’ale Adumim. Arab Jahalin 
are divided into three clans: Abu Dahuk clan, Salamat clan, and Sreah clan. 
They lived in areas that stretch between Jerusalem and Jericho. The clan that 
was affected and faced forcible displacement and pressure to leave was the 
Salamat clan. The Salamat clan lived in the Murassas area. In 1979, the 
Israelis started building the Ma’ale Adumim settlement. The Israelis started 
the displacement plan for individual families, so as not to make it obvious to 
the Palestinian communities and the media. In this they succeeded because 
the land was spacious and small number of families lived in it. They kept up 
this strategy of displacing the Bedouins until 1993, when the eastern side 
became a military zone, and three-fourths of the land came under the 
domain of the Ma’ale Adumim administrative area. The Jahalin Bedouins 
ended up without land. The confrontations started between the settlers and 
the Bedouins. The Bedouins protested against the shrinking of their land. 
I remember living in an area called Um Al Ghaleen, in the middle of the 
Ma’ale Adumim. We used have around 200 goats; we did not need to be 
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workers and search for jobs. Most of the Bedouins lived off of the livestock 
they owned. They were happy, but unfortunately, when the land started to 
shrink on them, and the Israelis forced them to leave the area, they went to 
the Israeli courts, but the Israeli courts were always on the settlers’ side. The 
courts ruled against the Bedouins and supported the displacement policy 
against the Bedouins. They did offer an alternative, but what alternatives? 
God knows. Families who used to live on 40 to 50 dunams [one dunam of 
land is roughly equivalent to 1,000 square meters] were offered an exchange 
of land that was 500 meters, and next to a garbage dump.117 
 
 
 According to a 2013 B’Tselem report, in 1994, the Civil Administration displaced 
dozens of Jahalin Bedouins from Khan Al Ahmar to a site near the municipal garbage 
dump where approximately more than 1,500 tons of garbage is trucked daily, mostly from 
Jerusalem. The garbage dumb in Abu Dis began operation in the early 1980s, shortly after 
the village land was confiscated from its Palestinian owners.  
The Israeli authority continued land confiscation from Palestinians’ privately owned 
land for the expansion of the Ma’ale Adumim settlement. Since the 1980s, and during the 
construction of Ma’ale Adumim, Israel demolished tents and homes of the Jahalin 
Bedouins. The 2009 Bimkom and B’Tselem report states, “the establishment of Ma’ale 
Adumim entails three levels of violation of Palestinians’ rights: infringement of the right of 
individual Palestinians, whose lands were expropriated or who were expelled from their 
place of residence; infringement of the rights of entire Palestinian communities, whose 
development needs were severely compromised; and infringement of the collective right of 
the Palestinian people to viable state, with reasonable territorial contiguity.” 118  According 
to Ilan Pape, “Ma’ale Adumim, a colony that attracted the less fortunate Jewish dwellers of 
Jerusalem, and grew to such a size that has strangled Abu Dis and other neighborhoods of 
East Jerusalem. The Israel plans in 2012 to extend this sprawl from East Jerusalem to the 
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Dead Sea, and in so doing cut the West Bank into two inaccessible parts.”119 The Ma’ale 
Adumim settlement is a unique case. Israel not only confiscated farmland to build the 
settlement, but expelled the Palestinians who were living on the land in order to replace it 
with other people. 
  In an interview I conducted earlier this year (March, 2018), Abu Fahed, who now 
lives in Beit Iksa, said,  
The reason behind all of this is that Israel wants to empty the land of the 
Palestinians in order to replace them with new Jewish settlers. These sheep that you 
are seeing are part of our tradition; it’s part of our connection with this land. We 
inherited this land and this lifestyle from our grandparents and ancestors. This land 
was rich and it was the land of honey; today it’s the land of onions due to the 
occupation. The occupation aims to empty this land of villages, deserts, and cities in 
order for new settlements and newcomers to take over. In 1981, I built a house and 
it was registered and legal, but the occupation demolished it. Even now, I am not 
allowed to visit my land or to build anything. The Israeli authorities demolished it. 
Even the tent that I am living in now with my family is under threat to be 
demolished. I don’t know when, but we live with the fear of not knowing what our 
fate is. I dream of going back to the Naqab to live in a tent and stay poor all my life 
but with dignity and with a homeland. [Here] I feel as a stranger.120 
 
 
 According to Pappé “in order to establish settlements in the Occupied areas, Israel 
used the same legal practices it had employed in Israel itself from 1948 to 1967.” 121 Just 
like other settlements in the West Bank, the Ma’ale Adummim settlement was built on 
Palestinian privately owned land that was requisitioned under military orders for security 
reasons. Three cases mentioned in the 2009 report illustrated how The Israeli High Court of 
Justice approved requisition orders issued to enable the establishment of settlements. 
However, in 1979, the Israeli Court held that the requisition order issued for the Orthodox 
Jewish Israeli settlement, Elon Moreh in the city of Nablus, was illegal since it was 
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intended for a civilian settlement and had nothing to do with security reasons. Elon Moreh 
is built on confiscated land from two Palestinian villages, Azmut and Deir al-Hatab. After 
this judgment, the Israeli authority stopped using requisition orders to confiscate land, but 
instead they declared 90,000 hectares of the West Bank land as state land. 
 In 1993, the Israeli Civil Administration’s plan was to empty the land of its 
inhabitants to allow the expansion of the Ma’ale Adumim settlement. According to the 
2009 Bimkom report, “The Prohibited Zone,” 200 Bedouins from the Jahalin tribe were 
forced to leave and relocate inside the village of Abu Dis. “The principal goal of these 
plans was to transfer the Jahalin living close to the settlement to the Palestinian side of the 
barrier in order to ensure that the Ma’ale Adummim enclave created by the barrier would 
be free of Palestinian residents.”122   
 Over the past decades, the Bedouins in the Naqab and in the West Bank have gone 
from being ignored in the scholarly context of the Palestine-Israel conflict to being 
increasingly significant. After the Oslo Accord, several NGOs and human rights activists 
such as Adalah, ("justice" in Arabic) an independent human rights organization, B'tselem, 
the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, and the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) all played a role in bringing 
awareness of the Bedouins and recognizing the role of the Naqab in their lives. These 
examples of NGOs became prominent political professionals nationally and internationally, 
and raised the question of the Bedouins and why they remained marginalized. Adalah 
reported that the Israeli government in 2011 approved a law called the “Prawer Plan.” The 
Prawer Plan took place without the consultation of the Bedouins. Adalah elaborated further 
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that the plan was a gross violation of the constitutional rights of the Arab Bedouin citizens 
of the freedom to choose their own residence.  
Since the Prawer plan, Israel’s government announced more plans that will displace 
over 10,000 Bedouins to plant forests, build military centers, and establish new Jewish 
settlements in their place.123 Mohammad Abd El Hassan, a former resident of Lajoun, 
comes from a Bedouin village that does not exist anymore; in 1948, Israel demolished his 
village and replaced it with trees. Mohammad Abd El Hassan told Adalah in an interview, 
“I was born in the year 1924 in Lajoun before the establishment of the Israeli State. We had 
the nicest life here, but now when I visit my old village and I see how they replaced 
humans with trees and I see the remains of what was one day my village I feel shocked.”124  
According to Paapé,“The JNF (The Jewish National Fund) has built national parks 
made up primarily of European style conifers, instead of trees indigenous to the area, over 
destroyed Palestinian villages since the creation of Israel in 1948.”125 Suad Bisharah, head 
of the Legal Department of Adalah, explains that the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights states in Article 17, “everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in 
association with others; in addition, no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”126 
 Mansour Nasasra, a scholar of Middle East Politics and International Relations 
teaches at University of Exeter explains that the Bedouins saw very clearly that the Prawer 
Plan with its aim for the destruction and demolition of the Bedouin homes would mean 
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another catastrophe, or Nakhba, for them.127  In addition, NGOs such as the Regional 
Council of Unrecognized Villages and the local newspaper, Akhbar al Naqab, attempted to 
develop an archive of materials and interviews of various tribal Sheikhs for the purpose of 
establishing their own documentary archives.128  
According to Masalha, for the million of Palestinian refugees since the 1948, the 
past is still present.129 The expulsion and displacement of the Palestinians, whether in the 
West Bank or in the state of Israel, became more intense with the E1 plan, and the Israeli 
ethnic cleansing policy continues today. The displacement and forced urbanization of the 
Jahalin Bedouins in the West Bank and East Jerusalem is more than expansion of 
settlements and occupation of the West Bank. It is also a cultural cleansing of a way of life 
that survived for thousands of years. Urbanized Bedouins will not be Bedouins anymore. 
The Bedouins who for centuries used to freely herd their livestock in the Naqab desert 
before the creation of Israel in 1948, were forced to leave their land. Despite the 1948 
expulsion, their steadfastness and determination to continue their way of life did not stop 
until the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967. Unfortunately, this time their life is 
vanishing through displacement and change of tradition and culture. In addition to the 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Bedouin Women: Between Militarized Occupation and Tradition 
 
           Palestinian Bedouins in the West Bank are a unique case. For centuries, Bedouins 
in historical Palestine were organized into tribes and obtained their livelihood from 
herding their livestock, making dairy products, and in some cases growing crops. Today, 
and since the birth of Israel in 1948, Bedouins have undergone forced displacement in the 
name of urbanization. The rapid change in their way of life entailed the loss of culture, 
tradition, and rights. Today, Bedouins in the West Bank are caught between occupation 
and tradition. Palestinian Bedouin women have been unfavorably affected by occupation 
policies of forced resettlement, urbanization, and demolition of their homes. This chapter  
the social and cultural changes that transformed the life of the Bedouin women in the 
West Bank of Palestine. My research is based on a case study of the Jahalin tribe who 
were expelled from their original land, al Naqab, after the creation of Israel in 1948. The 
Bedouins became refugees in scattered areas in the West Bank next to East Jerusalem, 
Bethlehem, Hebron, and Jericho. After the 1993 Oslo Accord, Israelis considered  
Bedouins to be an  obstacle for the expansion of illegal settlements in the occupied 
territory and faced expulsion for the second time. As a result of the Israeli occupation’s 
policy of displacement, the Bedouins in the West Bank were forcibly displaced to resettle 
in small towns that lacked essential characteristics of what an urban set up should look 
like. Three East Jerusalem Palestinian villages are clear examples. Beit Iksa is surrounded 
by a segregation wall. It has one entrance, a military checkpoint that no one can leave or 
enter without a permit from the Israeli authorities. Abu Dis is located next to the garbage 
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dump. And al Jib village has a military checkpoint dividing it in half. According to 
B’TSELEM, the Israeli information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied 
Territories, Israel built the segregation wall to isolate the Palestinians from their 
neighborhoods, to make it impossible for the farmers to reach their agricultural areas, and 
Jerusalem, in order for Israel to have a strict military control over the Palestinians and 
their land.  Tens of thousands of hectares, including pastureland and farmland, have been 
seized from Palestinians over the years and generously allocated to settlements, build the 
segregation wall, to build hundreds of kilometers of bypass roads for settlers, and 
checkpoints.130  Despite Bedouin women being subjected to patriarchal rule and tradition, 
the military rule and occupation of the West Bank played a dominant role in oppressing, 
marginalizing, harassing, and humiliating the Bedouin women in the West Bank. 
Moreover, Bedouin women once played a dominant role in the household by working in 
agriculture, looking after the livestock and making dairy products; the forced 
displacement, in the name of urbanization, limited the social and economic opportunities 
for Bedouin women.    
 Between 2014-2016 I conducted multiple in-depth interviews with Jahalin women 
who lived in East Jerusalem in the villages of Beit Iksa, Nabi Samuel, al Jib, Khan al-
Ahmar, and Abu Dis. These interviews give voice to the Jahalin Bedouin women as they 
tell their own stories. Through the Bedouin women’s voice, I examine the impact on 
Bedouin women of living a daily life under patriarchal rule and traditional Bedouin way 
of life, forced displacement and the expansions of the illegal settlements, and Israel’s 
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militarized occupation. All of these factors demonstrate the multiple and complex social, 
cultural, and economic challenges experienced by Bedouin women.  
 
The Impact Of The Segregation Wall, Checkpoints, and Permits 
 
             According to the testimony of many Bedouin women, the aspects of the Israeli 
occupation that most severely constrain the daily movement of the Palestinians are the 
segregation wall, checkpoints, and permits. Beit Iksa lies northwest of Jerusalem. It is 
considered to be within the West Bank. Most of the village’s land was confiscated by the 
Israeli authorities. According to B’Tselem’s 2016 Report, the land owned by villagers 
was seized for the establishment of the Ramot Alon settlement. The settlement functions 
as a neighborhood of East Jerusalem and also was needed to build the Tel Aviv 
railway.131  Beit Iksa is surrounded by the segregation wall and Ramot Alon, which 
separates the village from its Palestinian neighbors and from Jerusalem.  
  The segregation wall consists of fences made out of concrete, ditches, razor wire, 
groomed sand paths, an electronic monitoring system, patrol roads, and a buffer zone.  
Israel’s justification for building the wall was to stop the suicide bombings that were 
associated with the second Intifada , circa 2000-2005 that targeted Israel and for general 
security. Thousands of Palestinians pass through the wall daily for work. The 
confiscations of Palestinian land for Israeli settlements increased as a result of  the 
segregation wall. According to a 2014 United Nations Office for The Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Report, 85% of the wall’s route runs inside the West 
                                                        
131 B’Tselem, “Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank” (May 2002), online at 
www.btselem.org/freddom_of_movement/20160817_isolation_of_beit_iksa (accessed 10 November 2018).  
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Bank, and 9.4% of the West Bank and East Jerusalem will be isolated by the Barrier.132 
Meaning the segregation wall resulted in an increasing fragmentation of the West Bank, 
including the isolation of East Jerusalem from the remainder of the West Bank. From 
1967 through 2016, over 200 Israeli settlements were built in the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem. Today, over half a million Jewish settlers live in illegal settlements built on 
privately owned Palestinian land 
 In 2010, Israel installed a permanent checkpoint in order to control the only 
entrance into Beit Iksa.  Most of the Bedouin women I interviewed explained that only 
the village residents are allowed to enter their village and only with an identity card and a 
special permit. The permits are issued through Israeli security and are only given to 
residents of the village or to people who work in the village, like teachers and medical 
assistants. A permit may also be obtained for funerals and mourning rituals.  Many 
supplies such as Rice, flour or gas jar for cooking  are not permitted to enter the village, 
so the residents have to coordinate ahead of time with the Israeli authorities through the 
village council. The village council must let the Israeli authority know if a villager wants 
to bring in, for example, a bag of flour or a gas jar for their stove. The villager needs to 
be registered at the checkpoint in order to pass through. 
  During my trip, my friend Fatima was my guide through many villages in East 
Jerusalem. “First we have to go to a village called Beit Iksa,” Fatima tells me. We take a 
taxi to Bedu to search for a car or a bus that is registered, with a driver who has the 
permit for entering the village. We travel to Beit Iksa four times, and each time we reach 
the village, the only entrance is the military checkpoint. The driver stops a few meters 
                                                        
132  OCHA Report “10 Years Since the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion.” July 9, 
2014. Page 2.  
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away from the checkpoint until one of the soldiers’ waves as a sign to drive closer to the 
inspection point. If we are in a bus the soldier comes inside and checks the passengers 
one by one; if we are in a car they ask us to show our IDs from the window, and if they 
feel like bringing us all down, they will ask us all to step out of the car or the bus and ask 
all the passengers to line up outside. In addition to armed soldiers standing at the entrance 
to the checkpoints, sometimes they are guarded with tanks. Fatima shows her ID and a 
permit that explains that she has family members in Beit Iksa. Although I am from a 
Palestinian background, I have nothing in documents to prove that I am. I show my 
American passport, and they always ask me why I am visiting the village. I say that I am 
an old friend of Fatima’s family. The soldier takes my passport and leaves for few 
minutes. After, he or she returns just to say I cannot enter without coordination with the 
village council. With Fatima’s connections and her family there, we manage to call the 
village council, and either he comes to us and takes us from the checkpoint or he calls the 
soldiers and asks them to allow me in with Fatima. I feel I was lucky those four times 
because it wouldn’t be unheard of for the Israeli soldiers on the checkpoint to deny me 
entrance despite the village council connection and Fatima’s friendship. Many people 
who try to visit the village are often detained or denied entry. Sometimes people are held 
at the checkpoints for hours if they are not registered as residents of Beit Iksa. According 
to BIMKON and B’TSEME 2009 Report, the restriction and the military checkpoint only 
serves Israel and its settlements’ interests while isolating the villagers and the Bedouin 
community who live in Beit Iksa from any social life and family ties outside the village. 
The establishment of the settlements in the West Bank involved expulsion of a Bedouin 
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population that had lived on the land before the settlements was built.133 Moreover, it 
restricts Palestinian travel between and within their cities and towns.  
         Um Ahmad is a widow and mother of six children, one of whom is severely 
disabled and wheelchair bound. Um Ahmad is from the Abu Dahouk family of the 
Jahalin tribe. She lives just inside the entrance to Beit Iksa in a small tent, a small house 
made from Zinco ( corrugated metal), and a small animal pen where Um Ahmad keeps 
her goats, dog, and donkey. The area lacks basic services such as paved roads, running 
water, and electricity. The Israeli authorities prohibit the Bedouins   from building homes 
from stones or developing their communities. They face the constant fear that their homes 
might be demolished and that the Israeli authority will expel them again to an unknown 
place. Um Ahmad described the hardships that Bedouin face under military rule. “My 
daughter got married to someone who lives outside Beit Iksa. She is no longer registered 
at the checkpoint. When she comes to visit me she needs permission ahead of time. My 
brother and sister are in a similar situation; they cannot visit me for the same reason. If 
they [Israeli forces] would just remove the checkpoint for us to be able to see our 
families. One time my sister, who lives in Jericho, took a chance to visit me and she was 
stopped on the checkpoint and denied entrance. I did not know about it until a week 
later.”  
             I visited al Jib multiple times, and each time I went with Fatima. Fatima is 
twenty-seven years old and lives in Al Jib village with her husband and two kids. After 
the Oslo Accord in 1993, al Jib was divided into two areas, B and C. According to al 
                                                        
133 Bimkom and B’Tselem, “The Hidden Agenda: The Establishment and Expansion Plans of Ma’ale 
Adumim and their Human Rights Ramifications” (December 2009), online at 
www.btselem.org/download/200912_maale_adummim_eng.pdf (accessed 23 October 2018). 
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Jib village’s profile, 92.5% of the village is classified as area C, which is under total 
Israeli military control, while in area B, civil matters are under the watch of the 
Palestinian National Authority (PNA), but Israel has control over the security of the 
entire village.134 Fatima’s parents live on the other side of al Jib, and to reach her 
parents’ house, she must cross the checkpoint. When I visited Aziza (Fatima’s mother), 
who lives next to Giv’at Ze’ev settlement, I was told by Fatima Dahouk, that the Israeli 
soldiers would not allow me to enter even if I had my American passport. I heard from 
Fatima that the al -Jib checkpoint is more difficult than the Beit Iksa checkpoint. I 
wanted to go and visit Aziza so I asked if there was any other way to enter, and Fatima 
said yes, but we’d have to walk through hills and go between trees, pass in front of 
Giv’at Ze’ev settlement, and cross a main highway road.  If we were lucky no one 
would see us. I asked her what would happen if we got caught. She laughed and said, 
“We will be in trouble, but because we are women they might only threaten us and tell 
us not to do it again.”135 I was willing to take the chance, and I visited the other side of 
al-Jib three times between the years 2012-2018. When I visited Aziza in her small 
house in al- (Area C) where she lives with her husband, I could see the Giv’at Ze’ev 
settlement on my right from the porch of Aziza’s house. I asked her if the settlers 
bother her she said, “Sometimes we hear gunfire from the settlers. We know they are 
trying to scare us so we will move. Other times, they come and start talking to my sons 
and we get worried.” Giv’at Ze’ev is only five kilometers from Jerusalem, and it was 
built in 1977 on confiscated land from al Jib and Biddu villages. People from al Jib 
                                                        
134  Page 17  
135 Fatima Dahouk , interview by Hanan Awad, al- Jib, March 2018. 
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village cannot get to their land without a permit. If anyone is caught without a permit, 
they will be imprisoned and fined.   
           Fatima, whom I came to know very well, expressed that she experienced 
harassment and humiliation multiple times crossing the checkpoints. I found that 
checkpoint obstacles are more than just having the permit to cross; these women go 
through daily harassment and humiliation that affects them emotionally and 
psychologically. Fatima has to cross a checkpoint that separates the village to visit her 
parents. Most of the time she walks through an inspection device to check if she is 
carrying any weapons. Fatima explained that the soldiers on the checkpoint already know 
her because she crosses the checkpoint often. She said, “One of the biggest challenges 
that I faced at the checkpoints was when I used be stopped while walking to get to my 
parents’ house. According to policy, in order to go through the checkpoint on foot, I had 
to go the inspection room and walk through an inspection device. If you have any metal 
or weapons, the device will make noise. One time I passed, and the device rang because 
under my Abaya [a full-length, sleeveless outer garment worn by some Muslim women], 
I was wearing a shirt with buttons. I guess the buttons were made of metal. The soldiers 
came to me and wanted to search me. I got so scared. I did not want them to touch me. I 
opened my Abaya with fear and said I have nothing—it’s the shirt I am wearing with the 
buttons. They all started to laugh at me and were staring at me. I will never forget that 
day and the way I felt.  
                Twenty-three-year-old Samah  from al Jib said, “I have to go through a 
checkpoint everyday to go help my mother. A few years ago when I was twenty-one, 
while walking back home, I was stopped at the checkpoint,  and I showed my documents 
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and they let me pass, but then I noticed an Israeli jeep following me. I looked around, and 
it was the soldier who had been standing on the checkpoint. He was Druze136 and spoke 
fluent Arabic. He stopped the jeep and asked me where I was going. I said home and that 
my dad was waiting for me.  He said, ‘Come with me’. I was shivering from fear while I 
was talking to him. It was not comfortable. I knew he was not trying to arrest me, just 
harass me. He continued driving slowly next to me saying things like ‘you are beautiful’ 
and ‘just come with me’ until I entered my house. I told my mother about what happened, 
and after that incident I never walked by myself. I couldn’t tell my father because I was 
afraid he would be very angry and would not allow me to leave the house again. The al-
Jib checkpoint is not easy to pass. I used to get up early in the morning, around seven 
o’clock, to be at the checkpoint. Sometimes they stop me at the checkpoint, and I spend 
hours there while they are investigating, sometimes telling me to just go back home. It is 
you and your luck. There is no assurance, and this is what our entire life is like. We live 
without assurance of what the next hour will bring. The Israeli soldiers purposely 
humiliate us at the checkpoints because they are looking for trouble. It affects us 
emotionally and mentally. My parents’ house is too close to Giv’at Ze’ev. I suffered 
psychologically when I used to see, every morning, the workers waiting in line to get 
through the checkpoint to go work and the Israeli soldiers humiliating them and trying to 
provoke them. The Israeli soldiers look for weapons, but we don’t have any. Sometimes a 
soldier thinks someone has a weapon, and he or she starts the search to the extreme and 
leaves us all waiting on the checkpoint. This makes a big line for the workers, students 
                                                        
136 “The Druze are religious sect , an offshoot of Shiite Islam . During the 1948 war, the elders of the Druze 
community, signed a pact of allegiance with Israel and the Druze serve in the Israeli army as a cooperation 
with Israel.”  Illan Pappé,  The Forgotten Palestinians: A History of the Palestinians in Israel (London: 
Yale University Press, 2013), 62.   
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going to school, and someone like me. Sometimes they call for more soldiers and security 
just to make a big scene—in the end no one has weapons or anything like that.”  
          Fatima’s mother, Aziza Ayoub Barakat, known as Um Saif, is married to a 
Bedouin man from al Jahalin and also lives next to Giv’at Ze’ev. She explained that 
each member of her family has a number at the Israeli checkpoint and has a West Bank 
ID card.  They explained that the West Bank Card is issued by the Palestinian Authority 
are nearly identical to the Israeli card. The ID number on the West Bank ID is linked 
with the Israeli computer system on the checkpoints.  Without them, no one can go in 
and out of the village. “This makes it hard for our family members who live in a nearby 
village but are not registered on the checkpoint to visit us,” she said. Even if they want 
to buy certain things for the household, it must be coordinated with the Israeli 
authorities at the checkpoint in advance: “When my husband buys gas for our stove or 
goods for the house such as flour, he needs a permission for the goods to go through the 
checkpoint. My life is always a gamble here, with a feeling of unrest as if we do not 
know what tomorrow will be like. I will never forget the day my older son was beaten 
and taken to prison. It was two years ago during the Eid. He was going from al Jib to 
the nearby village Nabi Samuel to visit his friend. The Israeli soldiers stopped my son 
at the checkpoint. He was interrogated and asked to put his hands up and down couple 
of times; they kept searching him and harassing him, and he was unhappy but kept 
quiet until they touched him below the belt near his crotch. That is when he really got 
humiliated and frustrated. He ended up punching the soldier in his face. Right away 
they sprayed his eyes with some gas and beat him up. He ended up in prison and was 
sentenced for two months. It would have been longer, but we paid two lawyers seven 
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thousand shekels to get him out. My son is still not allowed to get a permit to work in 
Israel.”  
               Nabi Samuel is located in Area C in the West Bank. Area C is under full 
military control, and the residents who privately own land in the village are not allowed 
to build anything new.  If they do, their homes will  be demolished by the Israeli 
authorities. Nabi Samuel is known as the “invisible cage.” From the east and the west, 
the village is surrounded by the segregation wall. From the north, it is blocked by an 
Israeli-only highway that leads to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and on the east, the Ramot 
settlement. The village has only one point of access: a road that leads to the military 
checkpoint built on al Jib land nearby. Similar to Beit Iksa, one need a permit and a 
registered car in order enter Nabi Samuel, which is located beyond the Green Line in 
the West Bank. Israeli settlements are built inside the village on annexed Palestinian 
land. The Israelis have their own roads and highways. Their license plates are yellow in 
color, which means they are allowed to enter Jerusalem.  The settlements are part of the 
Israeli Greater Jerusalem plan. According to the United Nations Office for 
Coordination on Humanitarian Affairs’ Occupied Palestine Territory Report 2011, the 
protection of Israeli settlements throughout the West Bank and East Jerusalem is one of 
the main factors determining the route of the segregation wall and its deviation from the 
Green Line. 
 
Bedouin women and forced urbanization: Abu Dis and Al Jib (Area C) 
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She said, “Our story is long. It started when we lived in what is today Male Adumim. 
We call it Um Murasras or al Juora. I was born there, my mom was born there, and my 
mom’s mom was born there. I spent my childhood there, all my memories are there. I 
lived there until I was nine years old. One morning in 1997, the Israeli Authority came 
to us and told us we must leave. I remember this day very well, because it was during 
the Eid days. It was the fourth day of Eid al-Adha. They deprived us of the joy of Eid. 
They took our land from us, took our freedom, and brought us here to a place that lacks 
anything to do with beauty. To a rocky land, away from everything—and not just that, 
near a garbage dump. It was difficult for us to adjust and adapt. One day you were 
living in a spacious green pasture land, and then you open your eyes just to see that you 
are living in a small, rocky land near the garbage dump.”137 
      Within weeks of Mariam’s forced transfer in the winter of 1997, the expansion 
of the illegal settlement of Ma’ale Adumim  involved expulsion of a Bedouin 
population that had lived on the land before the settlement was built.138 Mariam 
explained that it was not an easy relocation for her and to her family. She prefers to live 
in a tent. She said,  
“In a tent, the culture is different. For example, my eleven-year-old sister, 
who was born here in Al Jebel next to al Azariah, lives a totally different 
life than the eleven-year-old who lives in a tent in Khan al-Ahmar. 
Although we are Bedouins, our tradition was taken away by displacing 
us. For example, my sister cannot go milk the goats and take care of the 
livestock because we live in a town, in a house. An eleven year old in 
                                                        
137 Mariam Abu Ghalia, interviewed by Hanan Awad, October 28th , 2015.  
138 Bimkom, “Al Jabal: A Study on the Transfer of Bedouin Palestine Refugees”  (May 29th , 2013), online 
at www.unrwa.org/  (accessed 1 November 2018).  
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Khan Al Ahmar learned from her mother how to help in the household, 
take care of the livestock, and continue the tradition of making the dairy 
products. This way I lost my tradition and culture. Now there are 
conditions for modernization. I am not against modernization, but I am 
against losing my tradition. I will never forget that day. It was raining and 
cold. There were thirteen of us in the family, our belongings—whether it 
was clothing, furniture or kitchen utensils—were put in the same caravan. 
One week in the rain, and we couldn’t even cook or go anywhere. We 
became homeless, receiving humanitarian aid from UNRWA or NGOs. 
After living on our land with dignity and pride, we became refugees 
waiting for humanitarian aid. This was our biggest tragedy. Al Jabel was 
full of white tents. This reminds me of the 1948 Nakba. It was a Bedouin 
Nakba. With all this suffering that we had to endure, we also suffered 
from the Palestinians. We experienced discrimination that is still going 
on today. The Israelis displaced us to areas that were already owned by 
Palestinians, but what could we do? We found ourselves caught between 
the Palestinians who own the land and the Israelis who occupy it.”    
          By relocating the Bedouins to a semi-urbanized area against their will and 
separating them from their land and livestock, Bedouin women do not just lose freedom 
to practice their traditions as Bedouin women, but also their socioeconomic status. The 
displacement and the military occupation have left the Bedouin women with no 
sustainable economic assets and, at the same time, no access to rebuild their lives in the 
new “urban” areas 
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             Aziza, who strives to continue the tradition of making dairy products, faces many 
challenges from the occupation. Aziza explained that dairy production is seasonal. From 
March until June, Aziza works to produce cheese, butter, and yogurt. Marketing it is not 
easy, she explains, because of the restriction of movement due to the segregation wall and 
the checkpoints. The Bedouin women used to go to Jerusalem where all their buyers 
waited for them during the season. Jerusalem was the main market, and today they are 
not allowed to enter the city. Aziza has a few private buyers from the neighborhood and 
nearby villages. She said, “I make the cheese and hard yogurt; it takes so much time. I 
sell the dairy products, and it helps us financially. I make good money selling the dairy 
products, but my husband takes everything. He deals with the financial matters at home. I 
make around six to ten kilos of cheese every day during the spring. This makes about 200 
shekels (about $50). We have electricity and we pay for it, but it is very weak. We bought 
a refrigerator to store my dairy products, but sometimes I lose everything because of the 
weak electricity. In the old days, we had better mobility. We used to go to Jerusalem and 
sell fresh cheese and milk in the market—we didn’t have to store it. Now it is impossible 
to reach the market with the checkpoints and the military control in the Jerusalem market. 
The season was from February until June. That was the time for the fresh products.”   
          The Bedouin women face challenges of cultural adaptation within Israel’s 
strategies of displacement, home destruction, and the denial of access to their land. The 
military occupation in the West Bank jeopardizes the continuation of their traditional way 
of life and their distinct culture as well as forcing them to endure rapid economic decline. 
With the transition from their traditional land to a semi- urbanized one, the Bedouin 
women’s role has become less productive socially and economically. The Bedouin 
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women’s lack of skills to work outside the house has left them without any jobs and only 
the roles of wife and mother.  
 
Bedouin women and health under occupation: 
 
 Bedouins in general, whether the displaced in semi-urban areas or those who still 
live in the traditional land, suffer from neglect in healthcare services. Their communities 
lack health centers or clinics. The closest hospitals are in nearby towns or cities, which 
require time and money to reach. The military checkpoints and the segregation wall 
isolate them from the main cities and village centers. Aziza said, 
 “Clinics and hospitals are not close to us because we live behind the 
separation wall. If we have an emergency they will not allow us to transfer 
the patient unless the car is registered on the checkpoint. We don’t have 
health insurance. Sometimes we have to save money before we get treated. 
I suffer from poor vision in my eyes; I get migraine headaches from it. I 
went to a nearby doctor, and he said I needed to see a specialist in 
Jerusalem. But I didn’t have a permit (Tasreah) to enter Jerusalem. I went 
to Ramallah Hospital, and I asked them to give me a referral saying it was 
urgent to see the eye doctor in Jerusalem. This way, I could submit for a 
tasreah. After that, I got permission for me and for my mom so she could 
go with me. It takes about a week to ten days to receive the permit. The 
doctor in Jerusalem said I needed special glasses, but before that I needed 
a surgery because I have a retinal disease. My parents did not have the 
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money for the surgery so I had to wait until they saved the cost of the 
surgery to do it. But we had to go through the tasreah issue again.”139  
 Regarding access to hospitals and clinics, Aziza explained that sometimes the 
checkpoints would not allow an ambulance carrying the sick to pass. Clinics are not far 
from the al Jib, but the checkpoints are the problem. Aziza explained, “We don’t have a 
clinic in our village, but we need to go to the nearby clinic, which is not that far, but 
because of the checkpoints we cannot enter unless the car is registered. Even a funeral 
can’t go through if the car is not registered so that’s why it takes time and sometimes it’s 
difficult to get to the closest clinic or hospital. For example, our friend had her baby at 
the checkpoint, because the car that was driving her to the hospital was not registered. 
This makes it hard to reach a clinic or a hospital. It is easier to go to Amman, which takes 
you a day to reach but is easier than going to a Jerusalem hospital, which is next door.”  
 In addition to the checkpoint at the entrance of Beit Iksa, the Israeli authorities 
closed off the road leading to Jerusalem, even for people who have permits to enter 
Jerusalem for medical issues or work. This extended the travel time. What used to take 
twenty minutes to reach the city now takes hours, if all goes well. The villagers who 
need to travel to Jerusalem have to drive to Ramallah and from there drive to another 
checkpoint at Qalandia in order to pass through and enter Jerusalem.  
 
 
Bedouin women and the psychological warfare of forced displacement in Khan al-
Ahmar 
 
                                                        
139 Aziza Ayoub, interview by Hanan Awad, Al Jib-Nabi Samuel, March 28th, 2018.  
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                The association between forced displacement and psychological conditions 
within the Bedouin communities has received little notice.  According to United Nation 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) report, since 2000, the 
Israeli authorities have demolished some, 1400 houses and other structures in East 
Jerusalem. At least a third of all Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem lack Israeli- issued 
building permits, which are difficult to obtain.140 Demolishing homes and Israeli 
displacement polices for the expansion of Israeli settlements brought psychological 
distress to Bedouin women and children. Bedouin women are particularly impacted by 
living under constant threat of demolished homes. 
 Khadra Abu Dahouk lives in Khan-al Ahmar and said,  
“Israeli soldiers came to al Khan al-Ahmar and tried to convince us to 
destroy our homes by our own hands. They said that they were willing to 
pay us for doing so. The soldiers explained that they could even provide us 
with special trucks to move our things and even our Zinco metal homes 
and belongings. Of course, we would never agree to such a thing or move 
from Khan al-Ahmar. After the Bedouin men stood in the faces of the 
soldiers and refused to demolish their own homes, the Israeli 141soldiers 
gave them a deadline and threatened fines and prison if they did not 
cooperate. Today, October 16th 2018, the deadline passed. We all live in 
fear not knowing our fate. We all live with stress. We cannot sleep during  
the day or during the night fearing the soldiers will come with their 
                                                        
140 United Nation Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “ West Bank- East Jerusalem: Key 
Humanitarian Concerns” (December 2017), online at www.ochaopt/content/west-bank-east-jerusalem--key 
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141 Kharda Abu Dahouk, interview by Hanan Awad, Khan-al Ahmar, March28th, 2018. 
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bulldozers and tanks and demolish everything in our village on top of our 
heads.” 
          The real reason behind Israeli authorities forcibly removing the Bedouins from 
Khan al-Ahmar and their plan to erase Khan al-Ahmar is to expand Israeli settlements 
and connect them to Jerusalem. Israel calls the connection to Jerusalem the E1 Plan, 
which aims to divide the West Bank into two parts. To achieve the E1 Plan, twenty-three 
Palestinian Bedouin villages will be destroyed and some hundreds of Bedouins, including 
children, will be displaced and resettled in Abu Dis next to a municipal garbage dump. 
           Khadra explained that seeing her children psychologically affected by the daily 
threats of displacement breaks her heart the most. She said,  
“My four children live in a constant fear. In the beginning they used to ask 
why the soldiers keep coming to our homes and village. When they used to 
see the soldiers coming closer to our Zinco home, they would run inside and 
hide. They understand that the soldiers come to displace us because they used 
to hear us as adults speak in front of them. But they continue to ask why. My 
twelve-year-old girl, Amani, said to me once, ‘Mom, was I born here?’ I said 
yes. She asked, ‘Is this our house?’ I said yes, and then she asked, ‘Then why 
do they want to take it away from us?’ I told her not to worry and that we 
would stay in our village and in our house. Amani is very sensitive; she has 
some dolls and toys, and she sits to play and starts speaking to her dolls about 
keeping school books and clothes and toys all in one bag so when the soldiers 
come, they cannot take them from us. As a mother I worry about her, and I 
don’t like to see her living in fear; it seems it is everyday fear and that hurts 
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me. On the other hand, my son, Mahmoud, who is thirteen, got used to the 
situation, and he doesn’t show his emotions. He shows his steadfastness like 
his father and believes that the Bedouins must resist the occupation. When 
Mahmoud hears the soldiers arrive, he runs out with his father and the 
Bedouin men to resist the displacement and demolition. He will tell his sisters 
to stay home and not worry, that ‘we will not allow the soldiers to hurt you.  
The soldiers are cowards. It’s their weapons that make them confident; 
otherwise they are nothing to fear’. He speaks like an adult, not like a thirteen-
year-old. He says we have the right to fight for our rights and land. As a 
mother I fear he will get hurt and I am always worried. When soldiers come 
with their tanks and weapons, my little ones cry and hold on to me for long 
time from fear.” 142 
            Bedouin women and mothers act as the main caregivers in their family. Living 
under daily demolition threats and military rule causes stress and worries about their 
children. As seen with Khadra’s daughter, the impact on the displacement includes 
psychological disruption.  
 
Bedouin women between patriarchal rule, and marginalization within their own 
society 
 
            Stereotypes and misconceptions among non-Bedouin Palestinian people towards 
the lifestyle and tradition of the Bedouins can be seen in many popular TV series. Since 
the 1980s as I was growing up in Palestine, I remember the muslsalat al Badawia or the 
                                                        
142 Khadra Abu Dahouk, interview by Hanan Awad, Khan al- Ahmar, March 28th, 2018. 
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Bedouin soap operas. The Bedouin soap operas were famous during the month of 
Ramadan. I recall my grandparents getting hooked on these soap operas. Watching these 
shows you would think that the Bedouin woman was a princess whose only tasks were to 
go get the water from the spring and meet her prince on the white horse. In these shows, 
love poetry becomes the communication between the Bedouin woman and the Bedouin 
man. Watching these soap operas, one would think that the Bedouin life is all about 
romance. I asked Aziza and her daughter Huda about their thoughts about the Bedouin 
soap operas and what they think about the rapid increase of production in Bedouin TV 
series; they were offended by how the shows are not authentic and how they do not 
represent the Bedouin lifestyle, specifically the Bedouin women.  
 Aziza said, “The Bedouin movies are just propaganda about the Bedouins. They 
don’t look like us at all. You see most of them are sheikhs, and their tents are well 
furnished. It’s very different; they don’t represent us. In the movies you see that they 
have workers, and housemaids to do everything, and all they do is look good and have 
love stories. In the movies you see young women meeting their lovers at the spring. This 
is not true in the real Bedouin life. Actually, if the father of the girl finds out that she is 
meeting someone, she will not get married to him. In reality, Bedouin women do most of 
the house chores, and it is part of the women’s duty to milk the goats and makes the 
cheese for income. Bedouin men depend on Bedouin women in almost all the house work 
and the production of the dairy.”   
          Aziza and Huda both agree that the classical stereotype in the Bedouin TV series 
romanticizes the Bedouin women and attempts to offer an image of the Bedouin women 
as living a comfortable life. They explained that these TV series misrepresent the 
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traditionally Bedouin women. Huda said, “The TV series about the life of Bedouins are 
fake. These movies do not represent the real life of the Bedouins. They show girls 
dressed up with beautiful colorful cloth, with someone taking care of them. The 
household has maids, and they have workers to milk the goats. Someone gathers and 
brings the wood, and always there is a love story going on. This is not true as Bedouin 
women work hard and take responsibility for the household in cleaning, cooking, 
gathering the wood, and making the dairy products. The picture that these TV series 
about the life of Bedouins are not true at all.” 
 The muslsalat al Badawia misrepresent the Bedouin women, who once played a 
dominant role in the household by looking after the livestock, taking care of the house 
chores, and being experts in producing dairy products. In addition, in reality, it is 
considered a taboo and romantic relationships outside of marriage are forbidden in the 
Bedouin culture.  
 
Bedouin women and polygamy 
 
            The traditional practice of polygamy in the Bedouin life can be explained in 
different ways. Due to the patriarchal nature of Bedouin culture and traditional norms, 
Bedouin women are caught in the traditional ways of life, including marrying a married 
man. Having many wives traditionally enhanced the chance of having more children in 
order to increase the number of the kinship. This is considered to be an honor, and at 
the same time an economic advantage in having a big family. I met with sheikh Abu 
Fahed from Bietr Iksa, who is married to two wives. From talking to him, I found that 
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polygamy is associated with prestige and power; Islam allows polygamy only in certain 
conditions, Bedouin acceptance of polygamy is justified as a religious practice. I 
interviewed two women from Beit Iksa married to one man at the same time, Um 
Ahmad and Um Suliman, and Aziza from Al Jib, who wishes her husband would 
remarry because she needs help in taking care of the livestock and in the making of the 
dairy products. 
 Interviewing Um Ahmad and Um Suliman in Abu Dis was more a conversation 
than an interview. We sat on the floor eating traditional Bedouin breakfast outside their 
tent, and we opened the polygamy topic. This is what they had to say: 
Um Ahmad: I was nineteen when I got married, and I am fifty-five years old now. My 
husband died three years ago. After he died, Um Suliman and I made sure to stay 
together. Years ago, after he came out of prison, he got married again, but I stayed with 
him. We lived in a tent in Nabi Samuel. The reason that he got married again was that 
he wanted more kids. We each had our own tent.  
 
Um Suliman: I knew he was married and with children, but I had no other choice but to 
accept the marriage. He asked for my hand from my father, and my father said yes. They 
read the Fatiha before telling me; I knew about it only after the arrangement.  
 
Um Ahmad: I have three girls and four boys. 
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Both: Our kids are friends, and they love each other. Abu Ahmad was very good with our 
children and treated them all the same; that’s why today our kids get along with each 
other.  
 
Um Suliman: I was eighteen when I got married, and I am forty-two years old now. I 
never went to school and cannot read or write, but I made sure my girls were educated 
and that they could read and write. In the old days it was not easy to educate girls. Our 
parents were scared and over protective. 
 
Um Ahmad:  My older daughter’s husband remarried, and she has five kids. What 
should I do? Should I let her leave her husband and come stay with me? No, she 
should just stay with him and stay with her children. You know she will be upset for a 
month or two, and then she will know that she should stay with her children and not 
leave him. This is a Bedouin habit, and we are used to it.  
 
Um Suliman: Life is changing; it’s very different now. In the old days, the reasons 
behind marrying more than one wife was because the first wife couldn’t handle all the 
work that was expected from her as a Bedouin woman. Women took care of the 
livestock and marketing the dairy products. Women always needed the extra hand. 
That is why it was easy to adapt, except, and welcome the second wife.  
              Aziza from Al Jib never supported the idea of polygamy especially since she 
came from a peasant background. She explained just after few years of being married to 
her Bedouin husband, his family and friends started to pressure him with the idea to 
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have another wife. Aziza explained that in the Bedouin culture, a man is not complete if 
he is married to only one woman.  She said that many members of his family used to 
tell him, “Look at your brothers. They all have more than one wife.” “They also told 
him that I controlled him,” she said. “Today, and after many years of marriage, I finally 
told him that I agree with him getting married again. I am tired, and I have problems 
with my back. If he gets married, the new wife can help me. Look at the livestock; this 
is too much for me. In the old days I used to get mad if he mentioned the idea of 
another marriage. I was twenty-three when I married him. I have been married to him 
for thirty-three years. I am fifty-two and he is fifty-six. If he finds someone to marry I 
don’t mind. His brother got married on the same night as his son; it doesn’t matter to 
them. Bedouin women usually don’t mind if their husbands bring home a new wife. 
When I was younger, I used to get upset when my sister-in-law, whose husband 
remarried, told me, ‘Who do you think you are, refusing to allow your husband to have 
another wife?’ Now I am really encouraging him to do so. I really need help around the 
house; I go the doctors, and they tell me that I need to rest, but how can I rest when I 
have to make the cheese and milk the sheep every day? Dairy products and marketing 
them is not easy. I make the cheese and hard yogurt; it takes so much time, it will be 
nice to have the help.”  
 
Bedouin women: between education and tradition 
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            Although the displacement to semi-urbanized areas creates access to education, 
Bedouin women have limited access to these opportunities due to the occupation and 
traditional patriarchal rule.  
 Huda, who lives in al Jib said,  “I love high school, and I have so many friends. I 
don’t see any difference between us. I want to be like everyone else and enjoy life. But 
my father has a temper, and he is overprotective. He doesn’t allow me to meet with my 
friends or go anywhere but to school. If I go to visit someone, it is family members, and I 
am with my mom. Every time I say I want to go visit a friend, I have to be with my sister, 
and if I come late I get lectured, and he will punish me by not letting me go again. I was 
invited to a friend’s house for iftar during Ramadan. I couldn’t go; meanwhile, my 
brothers were allowed to go to their friends’. One day, I was alone in Ramadan, and I 
prepared my iftar by myself and broke my fast alone, because they were invited out, and I 
was not allowed to go. My father is not getting it that life changed. I want to dress up like 
my friends when I go to school, but he doesn’t allow it so I have to put on a hijab and 
look conservative. I hope when I get older and get married that I can find a husband who 
is the opposite of my father, so I can be free and do what I really like not what the culture 
and my father like.”   
 Amani Abu Ghali from Abu Dis said,  “I am twenty-one years old and graduated 
with a sociology degree. My dream is to complete my master’s in international law. 
When I was a sophomore in college, I was awarded a scholarship to go to Germany to 
study, but I didn’t accept it. I told my professor that I couldn’t go because our culture and 
tradition doesn’t allow us, as women, to travel for something like that. But I was 
dreaming of going, not because of the grant but because I want to travel to Europe to see 
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the people and learn how they think. It is nice to learn about other people’s cultures and 
way of life. Of course, I couldn’t even tell my parents that I refused the grant, but I told 
my sister. I don’t have to tell them because I know what their answer would be.”   
 Mariam Abu Ghalia from Abu Dis said, “The first thing we worry about when we 
reach twelfth grade is, are we allowed to go to college? Will our parents allow us and 
give us the opportunity to finish our education? When I was in high school, my friends 
would ask me, ‘What are you going to study?’ I didn’t know what to answer. I was 
worried and just wondering if I would be allowed to go to college at all. I thought to 
myself, if I were allowed, then I would think about what I want to study. I was so lucky 
to have my father. He was well educated, and he promised me that if I “got good grades I 
could go to college.”  
 Mariam, who lives in a semi-urbanized environment, has graduated from college, 
but she was limited in her choice of major or a field of study. She became a teacher 
because she knew that was the only way she could use her degree within her community. 
She teaches at the Bedouin elementary school in her neighborhood. According to Jahalin 
tribe Sheikh, Abu Fahed ,in Bedouin tradition, which is based along patriarchal lines, 
women are not allowed to work outside their community.143  
           
Conclusion 
Traditionally, Bedouin women played a huge role in contributing financially to 
the household through their participation in herding, processing dairy products such as 
milk, cheese, and butter, and collecting water and wood. The Israeli policies of forced 
displacement changed the cultural way of life that the Bedouin women experienced for 
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centuries. Bedouin women were forced to integrate into towns that lack the basic 
services. The socio-economic changes have led to the change of the women’s roles in the 
Bedouin household. If urbanization means a more developed society in which social 
changes bring higher standards of living, this did not take place with the forced 
urbanization of the Jahalin. Occupation degraded a land and its people and excluded 
Bedouin women, making them second-class citizens. They’re forced displacement by 
Israeli’s shattered the Bedouin tribal structure and destroyed their way of life socially and 
culturally. The settlers who live literally within walking distance of the Bedouin 
communities in Beit Iksa, Khan al Ahmar, and Nabi Samuel have more rights on this land 
just because they are Jewish.  Israeli polices have made life worse fro Bedouins. In fact, it 
brought more problems to the Bedouin households, especially to the Bedouin women. 
One of the most significant values of Bedouin culture and tradition is their connection to 
their land and the honor of their women. 
 The restrictions of movement, forced displacement, forced urbanization imposed 
by the Israeli military rule in the West Bank and east Jerusalem jeopardizes the Bedouin 
women’s livelihood and at the same time does not welcome them to an adequate 
urbanized set up. The Bedouin women are doubly marginalized as women, living under a 
patriarchal traditional life and as part of a daily life under Israeli military rule, which 
plays a dominant role in oppressing, marginalizing, harassing, and humiliating the 








Occupation and the Destruction of the Bedouin Men Identity 
 
“I have a birth certificate that says I was born in Jordan and a passport indicating I’m from 
the West Bank. One time, a soldier stopped me at the checkpoint and asked me where I 
was from. I said I didn’t know. I don’t know who I am anymore.”  —Abu Fahed 
 
         Rashid Khalidi who teaches history and directs the Middle East Institute of 
Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs focuses on modern Palestinian 
identity. He explains “Borders are a problem for Palestinians since their identity—which 
is constantly reinforced in myriad positive and negative ways—not only is subject to 
question by the powers that be, but also is in many contexts suspect almost by definition. 
As a result, at each of theses barriers, which most others take for granted, every 
Palestinian is exposed to the possibility of harassment, exclusion, and sometimes worse, 
simply because of his or her identity.”144   Today, the checkpoints and the barrier polices 
of the Israeli military occupation are places where identity cards are checked and where 
Palestinians are constantly reminded about who they are.  
       How do Bedouin men obtain their unique “Bedouin-ess” when they live under 
military occupation, expulsion, and forced urbanization? The Palestinian Bedouins have 
been forced to give up their land and their agro-pastoral way of life while, at the same time, 
are not offered any adequate economic alternatives. Bedouins in East Jerusalem were 
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forced to relocate to planned, semi-urbanized towns such as Abu Dis that are by no means 
beneficial to them. Bedouin men remain torn between their identity and forced 
displacement.  
            In this chapter, I delve into the Bedouin male identity in relation to tradition, land, 
and the impact of occupation. After multiple in-depth interviews with Bedouin men from 
the Jahalin tribe in East Jerusalem, I argue that over 50 years of imposed military rule, 
restricted movement, and forced urbanization not only changed their way of life, but it 
caused a friction in the Bedouin man’s identity, his role within his family, and with 
society. Bedouins for centuries sustained their identity as “Bedu” through the unique 
characteristics that come with their tradition and way of life. Abu Ghalia, who was 
displaced to Abu Dis said, “The Bedouin life means three things: the tent, the livestock, 
and the spacious land. If one of these three elements is missing, the meaning of a Bedouin 
will be vanished.”  
Historically, the Bedouins adapted to a harsh lifestyle for many generations.  
Palestinian Bedouins associated with the Naqab desert where they have adopted a way of 
life and values since pre-Islamic times. Bedouin customs were inherited from generation 
to generation. Today, this unique culture that survived for centuries seems likely to end. 
According to Steven C.  Dinero, Associate Professor of Human Geography at 
Philadelphia University, “Nomadism is more than a geographical mechanism of referent 
solely to be associated with the availability of pasturage for flocks, drinking water, and 
the like. Rather, nomadism is a complete social, economic, and political system that well 
supersedes the boundaries of mere geography.”145 
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          The Bedouin identity is shaped by gender roles, livestock, land, and honor. These 
characteristics are intertwined in creating the identity of a Bedouin; if one of these 
characteristics is missing, the whole Bedouin identity will be jeopardized. Although 
Bedouins are keen to adapt and adjust to modernization—and at the same time keep their 
Bedouin identity—the forced displacement to underdeveloped and socio-economically 
deprived towns gives no justice to the Bedouin traditional identity or to modernity. The 
problem, then, is not urbanization or the transition from a desert life to an urban life, but 
the way traditional economic processes and ways of life have been exchanged for poverty 
and loss of identity.  
 
Bedouin identity:  land and livestock  
 
Abu Fahed from the Jahalin tribe, who lives in Beit Iksa, explained, “After the 
Oslo Accords and after what they call the Palestinian authority, our life got worse. Israel 
is pressuring us to leave from every corner we live on. They claim that they have 
authority and that they should take care of us, that we should move to towns and cities 
and stay away from Area C.” According to the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in occupied Palestinian territory the division of 
most of the West Bank into Areas A, B and C was agreed in the 1995 Interim Agreement 
on the West Bank and Gaza Strip and was intended to last no more than five years.146 
Division continues today. 
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             Since 1967, the Israeli authorities have sought land control of the West Bank in 
order to ensure more Jewish settlers on the land. Israel uses the land law and the Oslo 
accord agreements to justify the forced displacement policies against the Bedouins in 
East Jerusalem. Over sixty percent of the West Bank is considered Area C, where Israel 
retains total control over law enforcement and restriction of movement, from people to 
livestock. This has impacted the livelihood of the Bedouins. In his chapter, “The Old and 
New Conversations”, Illan Pappé explains that most of Area C has been allocated for the 
benefit of Israeli settlements or the Israeli military, at the expense of Palestinian 
communities.  He said that the Israeli occupation completed the annexation of Area C in 
the West Bank and offers the Palestinians in Area A and B incarceration in cages. 147   
The Bedouin culture and means of owning livestock, which requires land and 
grazing ground, is one of the most important elements defining the identity of a Bedouin 
man. Abu Fahed explained the connection between his sheep and land as part of his 
identity. He said, “These sheep that you are seeing are part of our tradition, part of our 
connection with this land. We inherited this land and this lifestyle from our grandparents 
and ancestors. This land was rich, and it was the land of honey. Today it’s the land of 
onions due to the occupation. The occupation aims to empty us from villages, deserts, 
and cities. They want ethnic cleansing in order for new settlements and newcomers to 
take over.”  
              The first time I met Abu Fahed was in spring 2014.  He is from the Dahouk 
family, one of the clans of the Jahalin Bedouins. He agreed for us to meet while he was 
shepherding his livestock. We met on a mountain full of olive trees on the side of Beit 
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Iksa. First, he welcomed me and asked me to visit his tent and meet his family after we 
were done talking. He started our interview by saying that the Jahalin Bedouins are the 
Native Americans of Palestine. Abu Fahed explained that fifty Bedouin families from the 
Jahalin tribe live in Beit Iksa, and all of their houses are under demolition threat. Most of 
the families own some livestock, and their income depends on dairy products such as 
butter, cheese, milk, and meat. Some could not keep their livestock due to shrinking of 
the land and grazing pastures, so they work in nearby settlements, but they have to obtain 
a permit to enter the settlement. If they are caught working without one they will go to 
prison for three years and pay a fine. The settlers who come from Russia, Europe, South 
America, North America, and Italy say they have the right to settle in Palestine and make 
a homeland for themselves. But the real owners of the land are deprived of their land and 
cannot visit it or visit any relatives. The checkpoints and the separation wall pressure the 
Palestinians who stayed on their land. “The Israeli authority is making it hard to live so 
that we’ll leave and empty the land for them. The Bedouins in al Negev lived a sultan’s 
life; they used live with dignity, owned livestock and camels.”     
The Bedouins view the checkpoint, in particular, as a way of humiliating the 
Bedouin men and further diminishing their dignity. According to the Adalah Report, 70 
percent of the Area C land has been allocated for Jewish settlements.148 Abu Fahed said, 
My family, the al Dahouk family, has Turkish documents that prove that my 
family owned 360,000 dunnms in al Naqab. Our tribe moved from Tel Arad in 
1950. We suffer from the Israeli occupation; we cannot move, and we feel as we 
are in a prison. Second, our economy was affected. We used to have camels and 
livestock, and it was our source of income. Today, we can’t have camels or sheep. 
There is no place for them. We are displaced in small areas and limited in 
mobility. Occupation means oppression of the occupied. Palestinians are suffering 
from occupation, and no one is helping us. I prefer my Bedouin lifestyle to 
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moving to a village or a city for so many reasons. First, you are free when you are 
away from urbanized areas, and you live a private life. Second, when you live in a 
spacious landscape around nature, you become a thinker and you feel closer to 
God. You think about yourself. To be alone in nature is the secret of worship, and 
that plays a great role in the Bedouin life. In 1981, I built a house and it was 
registered and legal, but the occupation demolished it. Even today, I am not 
allowed to visit my land or to build anything. The Israeli authority demolished it 
due to Israeli government orders. Even the tent that I am living in now with my 
family is under threat of demolition. I don’t know when, but we live with fear of 
not knowing our fate. I dream of going back to al Negev, living in a tent, and 
staying poor all my life—with dignity and a homeland. I feel like a stranger. The 
authorities here are not Palestinians, but excellent Israeli security.149 
 
 Abu Fahed’s struggle for his identity is primarily a struggle to keep his land. The 
Israeli occupation controls the land by de-Arabizing the West Bank and Judaizing it 
instead. What comes with the colonization of the land is the colonization of the 
indigenous and their identity. The Bedouin identity is about to be cleansed even while the 
Bedouin, through his tribal memory, resists.  
               Al Naqab had been inhabited for centuries by Bedouin tribes, mainly semi-
nomadic pastoralists. A 1933 British archival report explains that al Naqab was almost 
entirely inhabited by Bedouin tribes.150 During the 1948 Nakba, the Jahalin Bedouin were 
expelled from their original land Tel Ard in al Naqab to the West Bank. In 1967, the 
Israelis occupied the West Bank and forcibly displaced the Jahalin Bedouins into 
concentrated semi-urban towns such as Abu Dis and al Eizariya.   
         Abu Dis represents an example of a failed urbanization plan. The town failed to 
meet the basic needs of an urbanized society. Israeli authorities used urbanization to 
confiscate the Jahalin Bedouin land and to restrict their movement, but Abu Dis is 
socially and economically dysfunctional and under military rule. Through the 
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urbanization plan, Israel sought to confiscate more land in order to build Israeli 
settlements and de-Bedouinze the Jahalin in East Jerusalem. Eid Abu Ghalia explained 
that more than 2,500 Bedouins reside in 18 residential areas near East Jerusalem, in 
which most are refugees who were expelled from al Naqab after the birth of Israel. Over 
200 families were re-located from East Jerusalem in the 1990s. When I visited Eid Abu 
Ghalia and his family in 2015 at his house in Abu Dis, I felt that there was something not 
right in the town. Abu Dis is a semi-urbanized town in the sense that it is not the desert, 
but it is not a fully urbanized town. There are many unpaved roads; electricity wires hang 
too close to the pedestrians; the garbage dump sits just up the hill from the town; roads 
are narrow and condense the population into a small area. It looked like a refugee camp 
more than an urbanized town. According to the Bimkon report, “The dump is the largest 
in the West Bank, and the waste from both Israeli settlements and Palestinians towns in 
the Jerusalem governorate are deposited at a rate of 700 tons per day.”151  
 Moreover, the Israeli authorities aim to corral the Bedouin population into one 
area to minimize Bedouin control over land. This policy has affected Bedouin identity, 
social life, and left the Bedouins economically marginalized. Eid Abu Ghalia originally 
lived in an area called Um Al Ghaleen, in the middle of the Israeli settlement of Ma’ale 
Adumim. He used to own around 200 goats. Most of the Bedouins lived off of the 
livestock they owned. In middle of 1990s, the Israelis forced them to leave their homes 
and land. The Israeli authority displaced the Jahalin Bedouins and did not offer them an 
alternative. Eid Abu Ghalia said, “Families who used to live on 40 to 50 dunnums were 
offered an exchange of land that was 500 meters. The 500 meters will not accommodate 
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200 goats. If you just put the goats by themselves this size is not even enough.” The 
Jahalin were forced to settle in Abu Dis in the name of urbanization, but in fact, the 
transition did not in any way meet the meaning of urbanization or modernization. The 
displacement impacted the identity and the gender roles in the traditional Bedouin way of 
life. Abu Ghalia said,  
In 1997, the Israeli court decided that even if it is by force, the Bedouins needed 
to leave the land. In fact, one day Israeli soldiers came with bulldozers in the 
early morning around eight o’clock to displace us by force. Around 3000 soldiers 
surrounded the area and divided us into three groups. They started with the first 
group I was in. They loaded everything—goats, food, flour, and all of our 
belongings—into a container that was about six by two meters. Everything was 
on top of each other including the goats; they destroyed most of our belongings. 
They brought us here and threw everything in the container on a hill nearby. 
Then they did the same to the second group and to the third group. Now here is 
the problem. They changed our lifestyle. I never needed to learn a craft or needed 
to be professional in any job. I always was a Bedouin who relied on livestock, 
dairy products, and animal meat. The first problem we faced in the village was 
unemployment so we had to sell 80 percent of our livestock. Land is limited in 
the village, and Bedouins do not know where to take their animals for grazing. 
So, the lifestyle of the Bedouins gradually started to change. If Bedouins live in a 
house with a small space, the lifestyle of the Bedouin will never survive.152 
 
               Living conditions in Abu Dis contrasted sharply with the traditional Bedouin 
way of life.  Seeking employment was one of the major obstacles Bedouin men faced 
during the transition from traditional way of life to a semi-urbanized set up. In addition to 
the tribal connection, land and livestock are a significant aspect of Bedouin identity. 
Once land and livestock are taken away from the Bedouin man, the traditional masculine 
identity declines with the decline of the social-economic structure. Occupation has 
challenged a unique traditional way of life that existed for centuries wherein Bedouin 
men’s role was to protect the land and to own livestock. However, since the birth of Israel 
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in 1948, and the occupation of the West Bank in 1967, Bedouin men have undergone a 
rapid, forced urbanization process, and Bedouin gender roles have changed dramatically.  
                 Ahamd Hamadien who lives in Sateh al Baher said, 
Our life depends on freedom and the livestock. The livestock depends on 
spacious land for grazing. Unfortunately, we are facing so many obstacles to 
continuing our Bedouin lifestyle. The Israeli occupation is trying to urbanize the 
Bedouins. This is contrary to what a Bedouin identity is all about. We rely on 
seasonal mobility between mountains during the summer and valleys during the 
winter. The occupation limited our mobility and is forcing us to leave where we 
are now. The plan is to displace us from here and move us to villages or towns. 
We are refusing this plan. We cannot live in a limited land. Our livestock is part 
of our life, and it needs spacious land. We are pressured by the Israelis to move, 
and they are not allowing us to build. In addition, we do not receive electricity, 
water, or paved roads. They are planning on displacing us to a place we don’t 
know anything about. If we leave here, our way of life as Bedouins is destroyed 
and our economy is destroyed.153  
 
 Ahamad also explained that in addition to being occupied by the Israeli military 
rule, they are also neglected and marginalized by the Palestinian Authority (PA). Ahmad 
said, “The Palestinian authority doesn’t provide basic needs such as schools and clinics. 
Also, the college graduates from our Bedouin communities do not get jobs; sometimes 
they look for a job for eight or ten years before getting hired. So the generation after 
comes and says, Well look, if the first generation did not get a job with their degrees why 
should we go to college?’ Our children will say, ‘If this person graduated with honors and 
was not hired, why should I even think about finishing my education?’ The Bedouins are 
discriminated against because they are not urbanized, and they are not peasants.”    
               The Palestinians are divided according to three classes: town or city 
dwellers, villagers, and Bedouins. Because of the way of life and tradition, Bedouins 
are distinguished from urbanized dwellers and villagers by their social structure, 
which is based on the tribe or ashira. Although Bedouins are known to live a nomadic 
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way of life, moving from one place to another according to their needs for water and 
pastoral land, the Palestinian Bedouin tribes became settled and continued a semi-
nomadic life and retained their traditional social structure. Ahamd, who struggles to 
maintain his social Bedouin ways and at the same time accepts education and 
modernity within his culture, feels marginalized. The Palestinian Authority ignores 
the fact that Bedouins are Palestinian minorities with different social and economic 
situations.  
         Atallah Mazariah from Jebel al Baba said,  
 
          Jebel al Baba is the most beautiful place. Its location is strategic. That is why 
Israel wants to confiscate the land. Jebel al Baba is too close to Jerusalem, and it 
is in the heart of what they call E1. We refuse to leave despite the demolition 
threats. Unfortunately, today the minister of the wall, Waleed Asaf, was two 
kilometers away from Jebel al Baba and did not even think to visit us to see the 
demolished homes. He is the minister of the wall resistance. I spoke with him, and 
he knows our situation. We don’t need him. This is Palestine and Jerusalem, and 
it is our land. Livestock is a major tradition for Bedouins, and we depend on it 
economically. We are struggling today as Palestinian Bedouins to keep this 
tradition going. Unfortunately, occupation kept pressuring us. Even the spring we 
used get water from—the occupation came and built an artesian well closer to 
Ma’ale Adumim in order to pump the water to the settlement and keep it away 
from us. They also built the wall. When someone wants to enter, there is only one 
entrance. They closed in everything around us. So in any moment they can close 
that one entrance and isolate us from the rest of the villages and cities. The wall 
also was built on land that we used to live on and use.154 
 
 Today, some Bedouin men are well educated and aware of the socio-political, 
socio-economic inadequacies of their lives, as well as the injustice they face daily under a 
strict military rule. Bedouin men’s identity has been reshaped through the rapid changes, 
and their biggest challenge under occupation is maintaining a steady job. Unemployment 
                                                        
154 Atallah Mazariah, interview by Hanan Awad, Jabal al Baba , March 28th, 2018. 
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remains a major problem Bedouin men face, and is a problem directly related to the 
military rule and the Israeli displacement policies.  
 
The military occupation rule and its impact on Bedouin masculinity 
             Strength and courage are considered masculine qualities in Bedouin society. 
What were once characteristics that defined a Bedouin man are no longer welcomed 
within the urban life. The role of sheikhs, leaders, and elderly men have been reduced 
as a result of the creation of the semi-urban town Abu Dis. Abu Ghalia said,  
Our tradition and culture stem from our heart, from our bodies, and it’s 
engraved in our memories. It is not that easy to give up our tradition and culture. 
It is true that Bedouin tradition and culture can be harsh in ways, but it used to 
make order for us. For example, if I was walking, and I saw two people fighting, 
and it might end up with one killing the other, I could go to them and say, ‘my 
face is between you’, or I could just name a well-known person or sheikh from 
the community and say, ‘his face is between you’. They would stop the fight out 
of respect for the person mentioned. Here in the village, this tradition will not 
work. If I go between two people who are fighting, I just will put myself in 
trouble, and the fight will get bigger. Things changed, and as I said, despite the 
harshness of the Bedouin ways, the culture and tradition kept order in our 
community.155 
 
               Today in Abu Dis the leaders, or the sheikhs, who were the decision makers 
in their community no longer hold the same status. Traditionally, loyalty was given to 
the sheikh of the tribe; courage and strength in the sheikh, in particular, were respected 
by the community. The forced displacement and the loss of a way of life reduced the 
respect of male leaders that remained part of the culture for centuries. Abu Fahed, a 
leader of his clan in Beit Iksa, feels that the checkpoints and military rule made it 
impossible for his role as a leader in his community to survive. He said,  
According to Bedouin tribal laws, we inherited all of the tradition from our 
grandparents and ancestors. And as the saying goes, ‘We breast-feed it from 
                                                        
155 Eid abu Ghalia, interviewed by Hanan Awad, October 28th, 2015. 
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our mothers’. Our great grandfathers kept this tradition going, and we’ve used 
the tribal law to solve some complicated issues in our Bedouin communities. 
We travel from one place to another to solve certain issues with Bedouins. I 
was asked many times to travel to the Gulf, North of the West Bank, and 
Jordan to solve some complicated matters. Today, with the checkpoint and the 
separation wall, I cannot travel to help solve problems. Some villagers still call 
me to solve problems. For example, not long ago two people from a village 
next to Ramallah had a financial conflict, and they couldn’t enter Beit Iksa 
because of the checkpoint. I met them at the gate next to checkpoint and went 
to al Jeeb, met my brothers in the diwan, and we spoke about their conflict.156 
 
  Abu Fahed said, “There is only one entrance to the village. We suffer indignity 
just from entering and exiting our village. We cannot even bring food for our livestock, 
and the separation wall that stops us from going anywhere limits even our sheep. We are 
living a bitter life under this occupation. The checkpoint at the entrance separates my 
family, and we cannot even meet. My niece, just two days ago, tried to visit my family, 
and the soldier stopped her at the checkpoint and did not allow her to enter the village. 
Also, my nephews, the sons of my brother Mahmoud, tried to visit me. They came from 
Amman and were not allowed to enter the village.” Abu Fahed explained that the reason 
behind the restriction of movement and isolation demoralizes the people of the Bedouin 
communities so that Israel can empty the land of the Palestinians in order to replace them 
with new Jewish settlements. 
            Seif Abu Dahouk lives in al Jib village. He said, “When I was sixteen, I used to 
work in the settlements, but it was illegal because I needed a permit to enter so I took a 
chance. Of course, I was not paid well. Now it is much better for me, because if you are 
married it is easy to get a permit to get inside the settlement and work. Now I feel safe 
working, and I get paid 4000 shekels a month (around $1000). I can’t get this amount 
here working for the Palestinians; anyway, there is no work here to begin with.” 
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              Seif’s brother, Ibrahim Abu Dahouk, who also lives in al Jib, said, 
My family lives in Nabi Samuel. I lived with my parents in Nabi Samuel 
before, but when I got married I had to move to al Jib. The Israeli 
authority does not allow us to expand our home or to build anything on 
our land; that was the reason I left. Now I work as a bulldozer driver. In 
the old days I worked in construction and built homes in the settlements. 
Palestinians live with humiliation every day. In other words, we live a 
dog’s life. To wait in a long line for hours to get through the checkpoint 
is by itself humiliation. As workers, we wait until the solider calls for us 
to be searched and to show our work permits. The soldier takes his or 
her time purposely just to make it harder for us, and the line just keeps 
getting longer. Sometimes the line becomes more than 500 workers 
long.  I was in prison for a year and a half because I was working in a 
settlement, and my permit was expired. I was going to work at that time, 
and the soldier tried to stop me to search me and check my permit, but I 
kept going. The soldiers followed me and beat me up. I tried to defend 
myself, and I hit them back.  On top of the one and a half years in 
prison, I had a 10,000 shekel fine [about $2500].157 
 
         Sief and Ibrahim represent examples of how Israeli occupation of the West 
Bank has destroyed the Bedouin lifestyle through so called urbanization. Israel 
sought to not only take over the land in the West Bank but also the Bedouin way of 
life. After multiple interviews with Bedouin men I found that the Bedouin man 
continues to lose his masculinity and identity through the Israeli military 
occupation and the expansion of the illegal settlements. The Bedouins continue to 
suffer from expropriation of their land and exposed daily humiliation at 
checkpoints, arrest without trial, restricted and forbidden travel to visit family. 
Occupation is more than land control; it’s the identity loss and the struggle for 
belonging. Sief and Ibrahim’s identity was denied and replaced with another. They 
became strangers to their own land and culture. The urbanization process does not 
mean they belong to Israel or to a Palestinian nation, but it means that the Bedouin 
way of life is dominated by the colonial power.  
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             Palestinian Bedouins are part of Palestinian society, and they naturally 
belong to the land physically and economically. The tie between the Bedouin man 
and the land can be defined as the main characteristic of the Bedouin identity. The 
loss of the land and the forced urbanization took this essential part of the Bedouin 
identity. The Bedouin man feels incomplete with this loss. The dispossession of 






















            Although I grew up in Palestine in a small village called Dier Debwan next to 
Ramallah, I only started learning about the Jahalin Bedouin communities in the West 
Bank in 2012. As the years have passed, the life of the Bedouin has gotten harsher not 
because of their way of life, or culture, or from the weather, but because of occupation. 
The fifty years of Israeli military rule in the West Bank made it impossible for the 
Bedouins to continue their way of life. Between 2012 and 2018, I visited Palestine ten 
times in the spring and winter. During these years, I witnessed how occupation sought to 
culturally cleanse whatever was left of something called Bedouin.  
          During my six years of field work in the West Bank, I came to understand that the 
Jahalin Bedouins will continue to resist the everyday Israeli cultural cleansing policies 
and show their love for their tradition and identity through family ties and the memory of 
an all-but-lost identity.  
                Urbanization is not a solution to many Bedouins. For them, urbanization means 
giving up a centuries-old cultural inheritance and losing their Bedouin identity. Despite 
higher education and urbanization their Bedouin blood links their past and their identity.   
               I was lucky to meet the Jahalin Bedouin men and women who opened their 
hearts and told me their stories. Their personal testimonies helped me to understand the 
hardship of surviving the life between occupation and tradition. I was fascinated with 
how rich the Jahalin Bedouin culture is and how this tradition that intertwined with land, 
livestock, and the tent are considered the essence of being a Bedouin. Generation after 
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generation, the Bedouins have kept a culture and a way of life that defines who they are. 
Despite occupation attempts to uproot the Bedouin culture, the Bedouin memory 
continues to protect tradition through blood lineage and tribal affiliation.  
             The 1993-1995 Oslo Accords, or “peace process,” were supposed to lead to the 
creation of an independent Palestinian state, but instead the agreement failed. The 
settlements, East Jerusalem’s status, the security borders, the right of return, and the 
water and natural resources rights became controlled by one side, the Israeli authority. 
Today, the Palestinians are going through further deterioration politically, economically, 
and socially. The Jahalin Bedouins are an ethnic minority within the illegal settler society 
and within the Palestinian society.  
          After going through a historiography and an overview of the history of the 
expulsion of the Palestinians during the 1948 war, I conclude that the three narratives 
regarding the expulsion of 750,000 Palestinians was brought to the attention of the 
scholarly world through the New Historians’ approach. This New Historian approach did 
not just challenge the traditional Zionist Israeli narrative but brought back the ignored 
Palestinian narrative to the table.  
            While New Historians and the Palestinian historians used new material and new 
perspectives from archival documents and oral histories to challenge the traditional 
Israeli narrative, I add the unique contribution through a new voice of the minorities: the 
Palestinian Bedouins. The association between occupation, displacement, urbanization, 
patriarchy, and the status of Bedouin women has received little attention within the 
scholarly world.  
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            The Bedouin women are doubly marginalized as women, living under a 
patriarchal traditional life and as part of a daily life under Israeli military rule, which 
plays a dominant role in oppressing, marginalizing, harassing, and humiliating the 
Bedouin women in the West Bank. The connection between the Bedouin man and the 
land can be defined as the main characteristic of the Bedouin identity. The loss of the 
land and forced urbanization took this essential part of the Bedouin identity. Bedouin 
gender tradition has been systematically disrupted by the forced displacement and 
urbanization. What shapes the current events in Khan al Ahmar whether political, 
economic, or social is the constant Israeli military occupation that controls the life of the 
Bedouins.  
            Unfortunately, this time the Bedouin life is vanishing through displacement and 
change of tradition and culture. In addition to the cultural cleansing, the E1 plan dashes 
hope for the right of the Palestinian state and for self-rule. The Bedouin struggle has 
become more than the name of the land and heritage, more than liberating the tent and the 
livestock; it has become a struggle to liberate the occupied mind and body. The Bedouins 
became refugees in their own country, exiles within their own land.   
           Through their voices, I only hope to preserve and record their story. The Bedouins 
are resisting the latest systemic displacement from their land. Will their tradition survive? 
Only time will tell. But I hope my modest study would contribute to raising awareness of 
their plight. As Palestinian national poet, Mahmoud Darwish said, “All the hearts of the 









           Fig. 1. Jebel West Jahlain Community with Israeli construction for settlement 
expansion leaving no place for the Bedouins.  
















            Fig. 2.  Jahalin Bedouin girls from Jebel West community. The girls with their 
families were evicted by the Israeli authority to expand the Israeli settlements in the West 
bank. 
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  Fig. 3. Khadra, 110 years at the time when the photo was taken. She is originally from 
al Naqab. She was forcibly displaced with her family to the West Bank after the 1948 
war. She died in 2016 dreaming of her return to al Naqab. 



















Fig. 4. Jahalin children from Khan al-Ahmar village witnessing the confiscation of the 
solar system that once provided electricity for them. 























           Fig. 5. Abu Fahed originally from Tel Arad area in the south Negev, now Israel.  
Lives on land that owned to a family named al-Shaer from Beit Iksa village. He explained 
that he considers the Palestinian Bedouins as the Native Americans of Palestine.   More 
then 30 years he has been living in Beit Iksa. He left al Naqeb by force in 1950 His home 
is under threat to be demolished any day.  
He said,  “The Israeli authority started to shoot our sheep. They are not allowing us to 
graze and if we are caught we have to pay fine.” 










          Fig. 6. Um Ahmad, widow and mother of six children, one of whom is severely 
disabled and wheelchair bound (Beit Iksa- Jahlain Bedouins)  
“My daughter who is married and lives outside Bet Iksa is not allowed to visit me 
because of the checkpoint. If your name is not registered on the checkpoint you are not 
allowed to enter here. My brother and my sister cannot even visit me, so I ended up all 
alone with my boys. They need permission before entering and it takes time to get it 
approved. If they remove the checkpoint it will be better and easier for me to see my 
family members. Sometimes my sister who lives in Jericho takes a chance to visit me and 
they don’t allow her to enter. I don’t know about it until later.” 






Fig. 7. Map shows East Jerusalem, Closed and restricted areas, Israeli settlements and 
West Bank Barrier. 
 Available from:https://www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/eastjeruslem_final.pdf 






Fig. 8. Map of Historical Palestine shows the Naqab Deseret in the South. 
Available from: https://fasttimesinpalestine.wordpress.com/2009/10/13/maps-of-israel-
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